Saint Louis University School of Law

Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship

2019

Reconstructing the Corporation: A MutualControl Model of Corporate Governance
Grant M. Hayden
Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law

Matthew T. Bodie
Saint Louis University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Organizations Law Commons, and the
Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Hayden, Grant M. and Bodie, Matthew T., Reconstructing the Corporation: A Mutual-Control Model of Corporate Governance. SMU
Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 435 . SLU School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2019-04.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.

Reconstructing the Corporation:
A Mutual-Control Model of Corporate Governance
Grant M. Hayden
Matthew T. Bodie



. Professor, SMU-Dedman School of Law.
. Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. The authors
would like to thank participants at the 2019 Labour Law Research Network conference
and the National Business Law Scholars Conference. We also would like to thank James
Coleman, Jeff Gaba, Joanna Grossman, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, and Summer Kim
for their comments. Thanks as well to the SMU-Dedman School of Law and Saint Louis
University School of Law for their research support.


Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

2

Law Review

[Vol. 100

ABSTRACT
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long
assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express
a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for
greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently
proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee
representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These
rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship,
which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of
nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are
acting in the company’s best interests. Academics who support stronger
shareholder rights are accused of pandering to special interest groups or
naively seeking a panacea in a plebiscite.
As critical theorists have documented over time, the foundations of the
shareholder primacy model have always been compromised. In particular, the
arguments for a core feature of the modern corporation—the exclusive
shareholder franchise—have been revealed as the product of flawed
assumptions, misapplied social choice theory, and a failure to hold true to the
fundamental precepts of standard economics. It is time to look at such
governance features anew, and reorient the literature around the basic purpose
of corporations: to provide a legal mechanism for business firms to engage in
the process of joint production. In this article, we demonstrate how the
prerogatives of corporate governance have been improperly limited to
shareholders. We then present a new mutual-control model of corporate
governance, one that builds on the longstanding theory of the firm as well as a
novel theory of democratic participation. These twin arguments, economic and
political, both counsel in favor of extending the corporate franchise to
employees as well as shareholders, and, importantly, provide a way to
distinguish these two constituencies from other corporate stakeholders when it
comes to governance rights. We conclude by assessing the current status of a
shared governance system in Germany and advocating for further theoretical
and empirical inquiry into organizational governance structures that provide
for joint shareholder and employee participation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a remarkable moment in corporate law. Everything is about to change.
The status quo of shareholder primacy clings stubbornly on, full of its old power
in appearance, and yet it is a façade. It is the Soviet Union after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. It is Persia after Thermopylae, the British Raj after the Salt March,
disco after the Ramones. We are at the beginning of the end.
This claim may seem absurd in light of the dominance of shareholder
primacy theory throughout the United States, the European Union, and
developing nations. The academic network behind shareholder primacy remains
resolute; almost all corporate law scholarship pivots around the central idea of
shareholder control.1 It is almost twenty years since Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman’s declaration about the end of corporate law history, 2 and
shareholder wealth maximization remains the governing norm.
But underneath the superficial agreement is a roiling mass of disputes and
divisions. The field is more fractured than ever before. The prospect of real
shareholder empowerment, through proxy access or shareholder bylaws, has
split the academy into subgroups that advocate for divergent approaches.3
Activist investors have gone from the saviors of shareholder rights4 to short-term
Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 300 (2019) (“Most
modern theories of the corporation subscribe to what is known as ‘shareholder
primacy,’ i.e., the notion that directors have, or should have, a commitment to manage
the corporation in a manner that benefits the shareholders.”).
2
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view
that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
3
See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing “sharply divergent views of the
precise nature of directors' legal obligations”). The Bainbridge-Bebchuk debate over
the role of shareholder participation in management is one example. Compare Lucian
A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 835
(2005) (arguing that shareholders should have increased governance power), with
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (advocating for a director primacy
model).
4
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2015) (noting research in finance that
1
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opportunists who should be marginalized.5 Money is being shoveled like never
before into passive index funds and exchange-traded funds—the absentee
landlords of stock ownership.6 Important recent scholarship focuses on the
problems of “principal costs” generated by investor governance7 and touts the
advantages of nonvoting shares.8 Leaders in the field such as Nobel Laureate
Oliver Hart,9 Michael Jensen,10 and Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine11 are
“public disclosures of the purchase of a significant stake by an activist are accompanied
by significant positive stock-price reactions as well as followed by subsequent
improvements in operating performance”); Mark Hulbert, A Good Word for Hedge
Fund
Activism,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
18,
2007,
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/business/yourmoney/18stra.html.
5
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System,
126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874 (2017) (discussing the dangers of hedge-fund activism);
James B. Stewart, Hedge Funds Should Be Thriving Right Now. They Aren’t., N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/hedgefunds.html.
6
See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP.
L. 493, 102 (2018) (noting that millions of investors have moved their money from
actively managed mutual funds to passively managed funds); Bryan Borzykowski, The
trillion-dollar ETF boom triggered by the financial crisis just keeps getting bigger,
CNBC.COM, Sept. 14, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/the-trillion-dollar-etfboom-triggered-by-the-financial-crisis.html (“In 2008, U.S. investors had $531 billion
in ETFs; that's jumped to more than $3.4 trillion today, according to Statistica.”).
7
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017).
8
Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN.
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028173.
9
Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not
Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017).
10
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 32, 33 (arguing that
corporations should pursue “maximization of the long-run value of the firm” rather than
shareholder wealth maximization).
11
Hon. Leo E. Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to
Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political
Spending,
Working
Paper,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3304611 (arguing that “Worker
Investors” have different interests than purely financial investors and that fund
managers have a fiduciary duty to represent these hybrid interests when exercising the
voting power of the shares). See Ann Lipton, Strine and Wealth Maximization: Cracks
in
the
Wall?,
BUS.
LAW
PROF.
BLOG,
Dec.
29,
2018,
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questioning the stability of shareholder primacy as a regulatory norm. The
corporate-law centre cannot hold.
Now that shareholder primacy is losing its grip on the corporate world, for
the first time in a very long time we can start to see the outlines of what will
come after. The next wave in corporate governance is coming, and it will include
workers. For too long, labor has been left outside of the corporate governance
gates. But we now see concrete examples of the coming change. Recent bills
proposed by Senators Tammy Baldwin and Elizabeth Warren provide workers
with representation on the board of directors.12 The Walkout for Change by
Google workers demanded, in part, the appointment of an employee
representative to Google’s board.13 The German system of codetermination,
where workers elect up to half the members of the corporate supervisory board,
showed its strength and resilience in the recovery from the global economic
crisis.14 And new managerial methodologies providing for participatory
management and employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe.15
Policymakers, workers’ advocates, and workers themselves are looking anew at
the corporate structure and asking why workers have been left out.
Despite these murmurings of change, corporations have more legal and
economic power than ever before. Over the last decade, corporate profits have
hovered between nine and eleven percent of the U.S. gross domestic product—
the highest sustained average percentage on record.16 Recent tax changes have
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2018/12/strine-and-wealthmaximization.html (arguing that Strine “is placing workers’ shared desire for certain
basic living standards on par with the hypothetical shared desire of all investors to
maximize returns, and claiming that mutual funds have a duty to advance those
interests”).
12
Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S.
2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
13
Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/googleemployee-walkout-labor.html.
14
[Add cite]
15
See, e.g., FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO
CREATING ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN
CONSCIOUSNESS (2014); BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD (2015).
16
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Corporate Profits After Tax
(without
IVA
and
CCAdj)/Gross
Domestic
Product,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1Pik; see also Tim Worstall, Why Have Corporate
Profits Been Rising as a Percentage Of GDP? Globalisation, FORBES, May 7, 2013,
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dramatically slashed corporate tax bills and returned billions of dollars to
corporate coffers.17 And the power of the corporate form continues to expand.
By providing corporations with individualized constitutional and statutory rights
of expression, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United18and Hobby
Lobby19 have extended the corporation’s powers even more deeply into politics,
religion, and culture.
Within the corporation, the shareholder franchise has long been the critical
control feature. No other group of corporate constituents—employees,
bondholders, customers, or suppliers—possesses anything close to this level of
control over firm decisions. The justifications for this exclusivity are well worn
at this point, even if they remain somewhat slippery. One model describes the
corporation as a nexus of freely bargained contracts, and therefore
presumptively the most efficient way to structure firm governance. 20 Another
justification is that shareholders are owners of the corporate residual, and they
have the appropriate incentives to make good firm decisions.21 Rights to the
residual provide shareholders with a common interest in maximizing corporate
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/05/07/why-have-corporate-profitsbeen-rising-as-a-percentage-of-gdp-globalisation/#6a27a3fb2a6e. At the same time,
workers’ wages and salaries have reached their lowest percentage of GDP. Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Compensation of Employees: Wages
and Salary Accruals/Gross Domestic Product, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=2Xa;
Michael Madowitz & Seth Hanlon, GDP Is Growing, but Workers’ Wages Aren’t,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS,
July
26,
2018,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/07/26/454087/gdpgrowing-workers-wages-arent/.
17
An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget for the Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C) (known as the “Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017”) (cutting the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%).
18
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
19
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
20
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors As Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the
so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“The corporation is a
complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants
to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities
that are available in a large economy.”).
21
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67-68 (1991) (justifying the corporate franchise based on
shareholders’ interests in the residual)
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profits, which reduces their tendency to squabble about firm decisions and
allegedly eliminates the possibility of having voting cycles infect board
elections.22 Scholars who believe in shareholder wealth maximization but
nevertheless believe in centralized board authority have tinkered around the
edges of these standard economic accounts by emphasizing the important of
board or managerial discretion.23
But these traditional arguments for the shareholder franchise are falling
apart—not just from criticisms by outsiders, but through conflicts from inside
the house. It is well-recognized now that shareholders across the board have
heterogeneous, rather than homogenous, interests that diverge along a number
of dimensions.24 Scholars are losing trust in shareholders with significant
power,25 and there is even support for nonvoting shares and passive
shareholding.26 Those academics who support strengthened shareholder power
are accused of supporting special interests and shadow agendas. 27 The house of
the exclusive shareholder franchise is collapsing in on itself.
22

See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 405 (1983) (discussing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)).
23
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3.
24
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791 (describing “several sources of conflict
among shareholders, including differing investment horizons and needs for cash
payouts, empty voting, and competing outside interests”); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew
T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 505 (2008) (“It is becoming increasingly clear, for example,
that shareholders have many different types of interests in a corporation.”).
25
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (“[A]ctivist shareholders are using their growing influence
not to improve overall firm performance, as has generally been assumed, but to profit
at other shareholders' expense.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (“[S]hareholder
voting is properly understood not as a primary component of the corporate
decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort, to be used
sparingly, at most.”).
26
Lund, supra note 8; Lund, supra note 6.
27
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 1754 (claiming that Lucian Bebchuk's
argument for shareholder empowerment would help “precisely the institutions most
likely to use their position to self-deal--that is, to take a non-pro rata share of the firm's
assets and earnings--or otherwise to reap private benefits not shared with other
investors”); Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A
Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014) (“Bebchuk is the sincere champion of one group of
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With the standard economic approaches on the ropes, we’d expect to see
alternatives rise to fill the gaps in corporate governance theory. But there is a
dearth of such alternatives. Most progressive scholars have to this point have left
the shareholder franchise alone and cross their fingers for more ecumenical firm
decisionmaking.28 Stakeholder advocates have not put forth convincing
theoretical distinctions among constituencies that might tell us which group
preferences are best captured by governance and which by contract.29 The
growth of B-Corps and benefit corporations has created a parallel corporate
ecosystem outside of the traditional one where shareholder primacy can been
watered down or diminished—but not replaced.30 Even those who dare to dream
big have—up to now—checked their expectations at the door.31 Forces are
amassing but still scattered and diffuse.
The reconstruction of corporate governance theory, at minimum, needs to
include a reassessment of which stakeholders should have their preferences
captured through the most powerful feature of corporate control—voting—and
which should have their preferences captured through contract. To answer this
question, we need to return to the economic theory of the firm. We must
‘agents’ wielding power and authority over others' money—the money managers who
control most of the investments belonging ultimately to ordinary Americans who are
saving to pay for their retirements and for their children's education—against another
group of ‘agents’ that he believes is somehow more conflicted--the agents who actually
manage corporations that make real products and deliver useful services (i.e.
‘productive corporations’”).
28
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290-91 (1999) (describing directors as trustees for
stakeholders).
29
Kent Greenfield has come the closest to proposing a redesigned board of directors,
but he did not lay out specifics. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 112
(2006) (“The specifics will be difficult but not impossible: employees could elect a
proportion of the board; communities in which the company employs a significant
percentage of the workforce could be asked to propose a representative to the board;
long-term business partners and creditors could be represented as well.”).
30
Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681,
682 (2013) (“Enthusiasts argue social enterprises will have a more positive and
sustainable impact on people and planet than ordinary for-profit businesses.”); Heerad
Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 98.
31
Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 442 (2011) (stating that “large legal changes that would
strongly encourage or mandate significant employee involvement [in corporate
governance] are politically quite unlikely to succeed”).
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reconsider the purpose of corporations and the legal and economic purposes they
serve. Corporate governance is about running a firm and aggregating the
preferences of members. Corporations need to include the participants that are
directly engaged in the business enterprise: employees. Such an addition to the
corporate electorate is both consistent with the longstanding theory of the firm
and counseled by voting rights theory. Together, both economic and democratic
theories support a model for corporate theory that incorporates employees
expressly into the inner sanctum of corporate governance.
This article catalogs the main shortcomings of existent corporate
governance theory and proposes a mutual-control model of the firm to replace
it. We begin, in Part II, by recounting the intellectual foundations of the
shareholder primacy norm that dominates current corporate law scholarship. In
doing so, we will focus on the core feature of that norm—the exclusive
shareholder franchise—and the arguments put forth in support of it. These
arguments have a range of problems: they are based on a number of faulty
empirical assumptions; they misapply basic economic and social choice theory;
and, in the end, they often rely on a bit wishful thinking on the part of legal
scholars determined to paper over the cracks in their theories. This has left the
scholarly case for shareholder voting—most of which comes out of the law-andeconomics tradition—on the verge of collapse.
In the central sections of the article, we develop a mutual-control theory of
corporate governance. In Part III, we begin to reconstruct corporate governance
scholarship by returning to and reinvigorating the longstanding theory of the
firm. This theory, born out of a desire to explain why business firms exist apart
from markets in the first place, is not only consistent with but actually militates
in favor of greater employee participation in corporate governance. As
participants in joint production, those employees should also have voting rights
within the firm. In Part IV, we develop a new theory of democratic participation
that helps explain which corporate constituents should be extended the corporate
franchise rights (and. just as importantly, which should not). This theory, fully
consistent with mainstream democratic theory and informed by voting rights
jurisprudence, also counsels in favor of extending voting rights to employees in
ordinary corporate governance situations. We will also examine the example of
German codetermination as an empirical proof of concept. In the end, the
economic theory of the firm and the democratic theory of participation provide
the foundation for a new vision of corporate governance, one that includes
workers and shareholders, labor and equity, for the benefit of all corporate
stakeholders.
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II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Shareholder primacy, a version of corporate governance that assigns
priority to shareholder interests above all others, has been the consensus
governance model in corporate law for at least thirty years. 32 The exclusive
shareholder election of the board of directors has been around even longer,
dating back to the proliferation of corporations in the nineteenth century.33 But
while corporate law currently embodies both of these governing principles, they
are not necessary components of the corporate form. In fact, shareholder
primacy theory has been riddled with inconsistencies and spackled-over cracks
from its inception.
A. The Structure of Corporate Governance
The corporation is the dominant organizational form for businesses in the
United States. Although a variety of legal options exist—such as the partnership,
the limited liability company (LLC), and the sole proprietorship—the
corporation dominates the economic landscape.34 For that reason, the
Cede & Co v. Technicolor, Inc, 634 A2d 345, 360 (Del 1993) (“(D)irectors are
charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and
to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”). See also E. Norman Veasey, Should
Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices--or
Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. Rev. 2179, 2184 (2001) (stating that Delaware law adopts
the norm of shareholder primacy).
33
See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the
History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1351-53 (2006)
(noting that shareholders have had voting power extending back to the earliest of
corporations). However, many early corporations did not follow the one-share, one-vote
rule. See id. at 1358 (finding that the “thrust of early nineteenth-century American
practice--and, implicitly, the dominant social conceptions of the corporation-- limited
the voting power of large shareholders in some manner”); see also Henry Hansmann &
Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of
Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 953–54 (2014) (acknowledging such
voting structures but arguing that “voting restrictions generally served as a consumer
protection device in corporations that were, in a rough sense, consumer cooperatives”).
34
Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make up 5 Percent of Businesses
but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX FOUNDATION (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62percent-revenues (noting that only five percent of the organizational entities in the
United States are corporations, but sixty-two percent of organizational tax revenues
come from corporations).
32
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corporation (or company) has been described as “[t]he most important
organization in the world . . . : the basis of the prosperity of the West and the
best hope for the future of the rest of the world.”35 When we think of businesses,
we think of corporations.
Under our federalized system, corporations are creatures of state corporate
law. To form a corporation, the incorporating individuals must file a corporate
charter, also known as the articles or certificate of incorporation.36 The articles
of incorporation provide basic information including the corporation’s name, the
incorporators, the corporation’s business, and the total number of shares the
corporation may issue.37 An incorporation fee is also required.
Once a corporation is established, control shifts from the entity’s
incorporators to its board of directors.38 The board controls the firm and has the
ability to legally bind the corporation to its decisions.39 Shareholders elect the
directors at the annual shareholders meeting by in-person voting or the use of
proxies.40 Directors must act in the corporation’s interests and are bound by
certain fiduciary duties, primarily good faith, care, and loyalty.41 However,
directors generally delegate the actual job of running the business to the officers,
primarily through a hierarchy of employees headed by the chief executive officer
(CEO).42 This structure—shareholders select the directors, who in turn select the
officers to run the corporation—replicates itself in corporations from every state.

35

John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a
Revolutionary Idea xv (2005). See also LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE
UNCORPORATION 4 (2010) (“The corporation undeniably has driven business growth
in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.”).
36
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2015).
37
Id. § 102. Other permissible governance structure provisions include limitations on
director liability, id. § 102(b)(7), and staggering the terms of the board of directors, id.
§ 141(d).
38
Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire Hill & Brett
McDonnell eds., 2012).
39
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)–(2).
40
Id. § 211(b).
41
Bodie, supra note 38, at 86.
42
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized under this
chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the
bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the
bylaws . . . .”).
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Even though state corporate law allows for a great deal of organizational
flexibility, actual governance structures are remarkably uniform. Delaware
corporate law, for example, does not even require a corporation to have a
board,43 and yet all corporations have them. While there are some variations in
governance structures, both among actual corporations and in the guise of
potential reforms, the corporate form has remained relatively stable over the last
century. And the critical feature of corporate governance control—who gets to
vote, about what, and under what circumstances—has also been fixed: the
corporate franchise belongs to shareholders and shareholders alone.
B. The Intellectual Foundations of the Shareholder Franchise
Shareholders have held the right to vote within the corporation since its
inception.44 The classic justification for the shareholder franchise is that
shareholders are the “owners” of the corporation and therefore should have the
right to control it.45 The law and economics justification has centered around the
shareholder’s right to the “residual”—namely, the residual profits remaining
after all other claimants have been paid.46 Because they are paid “last,” the
argument goes, they have the best set of incentives for governing the company.47
Over time, the role of shareholders within the public corporation evolved from
absentee landlords into the center of inspiration. The theory of shareholder
primacy redesigned the purpose and function of the corporation to center around
shareholder wealth maximization.48 Although shareholder primacy has its roots
in the early case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,49 it did not achieve full flower
43

Id. § 141.
Dunlavy, supra note 33, at 1351-53.
45
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002).
46
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67 (“The reason [that shareholders vote]
is that the shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income.”).
47
See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21 (1995) (“Because shareholders
are in this residual claim position, most economists argue that they have the greatest
incentive to see that the company makes good business decisions and uses its assets
wisely to earn profits.”).
48
Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy,
31 J. CORP. L. 975, 977 (2006) (“This [shareholder primacy] norm is much more than
a descriptive account of shareholders' rights; it is instead a normative judgment on the
most socially efficient way of organizing the economy.”).
49
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
44
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until the law and economics movement in corporate law, combined with the
advantageous tax treatment of stock options.50 By the mid-2000s, if not before,
the shareholder primacy norm oriented both academic theory and boardroom
practice.
Along with the shareholder primacy norm, the “nexus of contracts” theory
of the corporation is also popular in economics and legal academic circles.51 The
theory rejects the notion that the corporation is a separate entity by describing it
instead as a set of voluntary contractual relationships with the corporation at the
center. Under this theory, the corporation does not really exist and instead should
best be considered as cluster of commercial agreements among a variety of
parties. The nexus of contracts approach counsels for a “hands-off” or defaultrule approach to corporate law, as the corporation is conceived as a set of
voluntarily-chosen relationships between different parties.52
Although these pillars of modern corporate law theory are both associated
with the law and economics movement, they have always had, at best, an uneasy
relationship.53 Shareholder primacy focuses on the importance of shareholders
50

Shareholder primacy proponents touted the importance of stock-oriented
performance incentives for management to provide the proper incentives. See, e.g.,
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay,
But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990). In 1993, the tax code was amended to
prohibit the deduction of executive compensation over $1,000,000 unless it was
performance-based. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012). See Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 879
(2007) (“The purpose of this legislation was to enhance shareholder wealth in two ways:
by reducing the overall level of executive compensation and by influencing the
composition of executive compensation arrangements in favor of components that were
more sensitive to firm performance.”). The end result was a dramatic increase in the use
of stock options in executive compensation. Id. at 906 (“It is widely believed that §
162(m) contributed significantly to the explosion of compensatory stock options that
began in the late 1990s.”).
51
See generally Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the
Symbolic Politics of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2018).
52
Cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing the “triviality hypothesis”—namely,
that “appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent
companies—managers and investors together—from establishing any set of governance
rules they want”).
53
See GREENFIELD, supra note 29 (proposing that a board of directors selected by a
variety of stakeholders would be “a genuine realization of the ‘nexus of contracts’ view
of the firm”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

2020]

RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION

15

to the corporation and often trades on the notion that shareholders “own” this
entity, the corporation, outright. The nexus of contracts theory, on the other
hand, abandons the concept of a separate corporate structure and places all of its
participants, including shareholders, on an equal contractual footing. At a
minimum, the two theories seem to pull in opposite directions when it comes to
the nature of the firm.
In their foundational work on the law and economics of corporate law,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel married these two theories into a simple,
intertwined structure. Their book, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,54
reaffirmed the shareholder primacy norm by arguing that shareholders are the
most economically vulnerable of the firm’s participants. This vulnerability,
coupled with their shared preference for wealth maximization, means that
shareholders should be accorded the basic governance rights of the
corporation.55 Thus, Easterbrook and Fischel contended, the other participants
in the corporation agreed, through their own contracts, to provide shareholders
with residual rights to the corporation’s profits and the voting rights that come
with them.56 The shareholder primacy norm provided the overriding purpose to
the corporate form, while the nexus of contracts theory demonstrated how the
parties have reached this arrangement through voluntary agreements.
From this core law and economics standpoint have blossomed divergent
approaches to some of the central corporate debates of the last twenty years. One
group of theorists, most prominently Lucian Bebchuk, focused on providing
shareholders with stronger legal powers within the corporation.57 Such powers
include power over corporate political spending, the right to access the
company’s proxy ballot, and a prohibition on staggered boards.58 Others, such
as Steven Bainbridge’s director primacy theory59 and Margaret Blair and Lynn

54

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21.
Id. at 67-68.
56
Id. at 17, 37.
57
See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 883 (2005).
58
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
557 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and A Reply to
Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2002)
59
Bainbridge, supra note 3.
55
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Stout’s team production theory,60 rallied around various versions of board
primacy. While these board primacy scholars disagree with each other on the
appropriate goals of the corporation, they all believe that a governance system
that’s less responsive to shareholders will allow the board to make better
decisions.61
Significantly, all of these theorists, like Easterbrook and Fischel before
them, are committed to corporate governance structures in which shareholders
alone elect board members and vote on other matters of importance. And this
governance feature has long been part and parcel with the broader theory of
shareholder primacy, which found its strongest justifications in scholars working
in the law and economics movement. Indeed, even as that movement played out,
to varying degrees, in many other areas of legal scholarship, it continues to have
a hammerlock on corporate governance theory. And its original justifications for
the exclusive shareholder franchise, many of which are now more than four
decades hold, continue to be cited, recited, and relied upon by many, if not most,
scholars of corporate governance.62
C. Cracks in the Law-and-Economics Foundation
While Easterbrook and Fischel’s arguments for the shareholder franchise
continue to hold sway, some pretty substantial cracks have appeared in their
foundations. In some cases, their arguments have been found to rest upon
assumptions about the interests of corporate constituents that do not reflect
actual constituent preferences. In other cases, their arguments make moves that
run counter to standard economics or, in some cases, misapply basic principles
of social choice theory. These shortcomings have been pointed out, and in some
cases acknowledged, but very little has been done in the way of rehabilitation;
instead, the old arguments and their dubious assumptions just lumber along
through the law-and-economics literature. And the main contenders to their
approach, within the law and economics tradition and from a more progressive
standpoint, have failed to paper over these original deficiencies or provide a
compelling alternative vision of the firm.
As we catalog these arguments and some of their shortcomings, it is
important to realize that our critiques do not question the basic principles of
60

Blair & Stout, supra note 28.
See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious
Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2089-92 (2010).
62
Including us.
61
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standard economics or social choice theory thought to underlie them. Instead,
we take those principles as given, and discuss their misapplication in the context
of corporate governance. It’s our sense that corporate governance scholars often
start from basic economic principles only to discard them when it they run into
(what they perceive as) problems. These arguments, in other words, will be
evaluated by the standards that their proponents set for themselves.
1.

The Contractarian Argument

One of the most basic arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise is
that it, like any feature of corporate governance, is presumptively efficient
because it is the product of freely bargained contracts.63 In this view, the
corporation itself is nothing more a nexus of contracts.64 Although it often hard
to tell whether the corporation as contract is intended to be a literal or
metaphorical description, there is no doubt that it has done heavy rhetorical work
in the service of the law and economics vision of the corporation. If all corporate
constituents agree to a governance system in which shareholders alone have
voting rights, who’s to say they’ve got it wrong?
Over time, even the most die-hard contractarians have conceded that this
description of the corporation is not literally true—there are some key features
to modern corporations that cannot be reduced to contract.65 The most prominent
63

This argument is given extensive treatment in Hayden & Bodie, supra note 51; Grant
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of
Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011); Michael Klausner, The
Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779
(2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 301 (1999); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989); William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
(1989).
64
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976)
(providing the original description of the theory); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 21, at 1-39 (providing one of the most prominent iterations of the theory).
65
RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 67-75 (describing the mandatory elements of the
corporate structure); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the
Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (1989)
(“Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation codes and other sources of law
contain many mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around.... [T]o claim that
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of these is the signature feature of the corporate form: limited liability.66 Limited
liability cannot be replicated by contract, but is instead, a concession granted by
the state to corporations in exchange for the ability to tax and regulate them in
various ways.67 Corporations are not reducible to a set of contracts; indeed, if
contracts were sufficient, then there would be no need for corporate law in the
first place.68
As corporate governance theorists shifted to using the nexus of contracts
more metaphorically, their reliance on contract theory becomes somewhat selfdefeating.69 Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, argue that corporate law
provides the “ideal” contract that most participants would themselves develop,
saving the parties from the transaction costs of developing it on their own.70 This
argument, though, proves too much, as the theory then assigns itself with the
task of assigning preferences—something that economists are generally loath to
do. Moreover, the preferences of these particular hypothetical constituents do
not reflect the preferences of actual constituents, even the shareholders
themselves. And there’s certainly no independent reason to think that the rest of
the corporate constituents would agree on such particularized governance
features like the exclusive shareholder franchise.71
This contractarian theory of the corporation turns out to be based on
idealized, fictionalized versions of shareholders and other corporate
constituents. And these fictional constituents, by and large, just happen to agree
with normative law and economics principles and the current structures of
corporate governance.72 But their supposed approval of every contemporary
feature of corporate governance is nothing more than Panglossian wish
fulfillment on the part of their creators. In the end, this argument in favor of the

contractarians would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse them of
blindness or stupidity.”).
66
See RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 79; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at 1137-39.
67
See RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 138; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at 1138.
68
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68 (“A corporation is not a contract.”).
69
For a more complete description and critical evaluation of this move to metaphor to
save the contraction position, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 51, at 538-46.
70
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1418 (discussing how “much of
corporate law is designed to reduce the costs of aligning the interests of managers and
investors”).
71
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 51, at 539-41.
72
See id. at 541-42. For a more extensive discussion of this idea, see Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: “For Whom is the Corporation Managed,”
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996).
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exclusive shareholder franchise is both descriptively wrong and normatively
hollow.
2.

The Residual Argument

The other foundational arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise
have also started to wear out their welcome. For example, the principle that all
shareholders have a similar interest in the corporate residual, the leftover
operating profit after all the costs have been paid, has long been central to the
idea of shareholder voting.73 Because maximizing the residual maximizes the
return to shareholders while leaving all other constituents (like employees and
suppliers) contractually satisfied, under this theory shareholder control over a
corporation will increase efficiency by maximizing residual profits.74
This connection between the residual and control, as calibrated by the “one
share, one vote” rule, plausibly sets up the proper incentives for maximizing the
residual and, therefore, the chances for a firm’s success.75 The contested link in
this argument from the residual, though, isn’t between the residual and control,
but between the shareholders and the residual. After all, any of the corporation’s
constituents could be assigned the residual and would then, theoretically, have
the appropriate incentives to exercise control. The question then becomes why
should the residual (and the voting rights that go with it) be assigned to
shareholders alone? Easterbrook and Fischel have an answer to this question:
shareholders are best positioned to be assigned the residual because they have
relatively homogeneous interests in wealth maximization. More specifically,
they alone have a single-minded focus on corporate profits.76
Over the last couple of decades, however, this assumption of shareholder
homogeneity has come under quite a bit of pressure.77 Many shareholders have
interests in the firm that go beyond a simple desire to maximize the residual,
including majority shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate voting
rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged shareholders,

73

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67-69.
See id. at 35-39; 67-69.
75
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 73; Bernard Black & Renier
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 194546 (1996);
76
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69-70.
77
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 505.
74
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sovereign wealth funds, and employee and management shareholders.78 In each
case, those shareholders have interests that may temper or override their shared
interest in the residual. And shareholder heterogeneity is not simply a matter of
shareholders with discrete competing interests. There is also heterogeneity
among otherwise similarly situated shareholders with respect to their definitions
of wealth maximization—shareholders, for example, with different time
horizons or risk preferences.79 And shareholder wealth maximization is not the
same thing as shareholder utility maximization. Oliver Hart and Luigi
Zingales—two luminaries in the field—have suggested that shareholders do in
fact value things other than profit maximization, and that corporate governance
should be structured to allow them to express their preferences on tradeoffs in
corporate decisionmaking.80 Shareholder interests, however you define them,
are quite heterogeneous, which leaves this second argument in favor of the
exclusive shareholder franchise on shaky ground.
Finally, it is simplistic to say that shareholders are the only ones with an
interest in the long-term value of the corporation. Employees may receive more
discrete and regular payments, but they too have an ongoing interest in the
success of the operation. Assuming that employees are paid by “contracts” that
are set in economic stone makes it easy to ignore that over time, the corporate
power of shareholders puts workers at a significant bargaining disadvantage.81
If shareholders alone elect the board, then the board will naturally favor the will
of their electorate.82 This dynamic has played out over time: wages have
remained stagnant despite a booming economy, while corporate profits have
grown at a staggering rate.83 Employees may have some market power, but they
78

See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REV. 561, 574-92 (2006); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 477-98.
79
See Anabtawi, supra note 78, at 579-83; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 492-94.
For a thoughtful review of the short-termism debate, see Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley,
Short-Termism and Long-Termism 12-21 (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2,
2016).
80
Hart & Zingales, supra note 9.
81
BLAIR, supra note 47, at 256-57.
82
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for
Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1165, 1177 (2017) (“The boards of these corporations did not view themselves as
having any national loyalties or loyalties to other constituencies, they viewed
themselves as elected officials in the republic of equity capital.”)
83
See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data (NBER Working Paper No. 20625,
2014), available at http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf (discussing
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also have firm-specific capital that cannot be moved, and they generate the value
that the firm holds through its brand, trademark, and good will.84 Because
shareholders control the company, they control the brand, the goodwill, the
ongoing business. Combined with the at-will rule and the dramatic decline in
union representation, employees have remarkably little power within the firm,
despite their ongoing interest in the business.
3.

The Arrow’s Theorem Argument

Shareholder heterogeneity also undercuts another fairly prominent
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise: the argument from Arrow’s
theorem. Easterbrook and Fischel first raised concerns, based on Kenneth
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, that corporate constituents with heterogeneous
preferences would be more likely to produce intransitive election results, or
voting cycles.85 This, in turn, would lead firms to “self-destruct.”86 This
argument has since been repeated by a wide range of law and economics
corporate governance scholars.87 And, as the argument from the residual fades,
it seems to have picked up some additional currency.
Like the argument from the residual, though, the force of this argument is
diminished by the fact that shareholders actually have quite heterogeneous
preferences with respect to corporate decisionmaking. But the Arrow’s theorem
argument falls apart long before we get to the nature of shareholder preferences:

diverging income inequality); Floyd Norris, Corporate Profits Grow and Wages Slide,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
4,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/business/economy/corporate-profits-grow-everlarger-as-slice-of-economy-as-wages-slide.html (discussing the rise in corporate profits
and fall of employee compensation).
84
Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 363 (2009) (“The positive reputation associated with a
trademark is due to the work of many persons associated with the firm owning that mark
over time.”).
85
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69-70.
86
Id. at 70.
87
See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 41-42 (1996); Blair
& Stout, supra note 28, at 257; Gregory K. Dow, The New Institutional Economics and
Employment Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP 57, 69 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
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it is based on a misguided application of the theorem from the start.88 First, even
if shareholders agree on an underlying goal of wealth maximization, that does
not mean they agree on the best strategies or board candidates to achieve that
goal.89 Second, the argument ignores the enormous democratic cost of avoiding
possible voting cycles: prohibiting interested parties from voting based upon
their purported preferences.90 Third, the argument utterly fails to analyze the
likelihood or cost of cyclical election outcomes in corporate elections, and under
some fairly straightforward assumptions, both are likely to be very low or
nonexistent.91 The argument from Arrow’s theorem for the exclusive
shareholder franchise is not at all compelling.
4.

Board Primacy

Competing corporate law theories in the law and economics tradition
sometimes offer more realistic stories about corporate law doctrine. But they
also do little to question the underlying structures of corporate control.92 Stephen
Bainbridge’s “director primacy” theory well describes the ambivalence of
Delaware corporate law towards the relationship between shareholders and the
board of directors.93 But his theory is somewhat lacking in normative punch, as
it ultimately fails to explain why directors should be given relatively unchecked
authority over the operation of the firm.94 Similarly, Margaret Blair and Lynn
Stout’s “team production” model accurately takes into account the many
participants in the life of the corporation.95 However, their model also leaves it
to shareholder-elected board to somehow manage these relationships
appropriately.96

88

For a critical evaluation of this argument, see Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie,
Arrow's Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1219
(2009). For a condensed version, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 51, at 524-30.
89
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 88, at 1230-32.
90
See id. at 1232-34.
91
See id. at 1234-39.
92
For an overview and critical evaluation of the various forms of board primacy theory,
see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61.
93
See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).
94
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2089-2092.
95
See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 28.
96
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2089-91, 2112-20.
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Whether they be “Platonic guardians” (Bainbridge)97 or “mediating
hierarchs” (Blair and Stout),98 there are no governance structures in place to
ensure that actual directors live up to the faith that these accounts place in their
ability to manage the firm for all constituents. In both cases, the ultimate check
on the board is left in the hands of the shareholders alone. And both simply rely
on earlier law and economics argument to justify the retention of the exclusive
shareholder franchise.99 Their hearts are in the right place, but those committed
to board primacy provide no independent arguments for the exclusive
shareholder franchise.
5. A Return to Corporate Purpose
Corporate law originally required corporations to establish a specific
purpose as part of the incorporation process.100 The purpose specified the nature
of the business to be established and provided a sense of scope. In a real sense,
the purpose established the legal boundaries of activities for participants within
the firm.101 Under the law, the corporation could not operate outside of the
markers of its delineated activity. This limitation was justified by the power that
the state had provided to the corporation to exist in the first place. The first
corporations could only be formed for a limited set of prescribed purposes, such
a starting a university or building a canal.102 But as the scope of potential
business purposes widened, the need for a specific purpose remained; an
unlimited corporation could, theoretically, seek unlimited power.103 Therefore,
97

Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 560.
Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 280.
99
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2101-2111.
100
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554–55 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“At first,
corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited number of
purposes . . . .”).
101
JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 60 (Arno Press Inc. 1972) (“[T]he general powers of a
corporate body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.”).
102
Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility:
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1145 (2012) (noting that
“colleges, guilds, and municipalities were often organized as corporations, as were such
public-serving transportation ventures as canals or turnpikes”).
103
Cf. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 554–55 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Limitations upon the
scope of a business corporation's powers and activity were also long universal . . . . The
powers which the corporation might exercise in carrying out its purposes were sparingly
conferred and strictly construed.”).
98
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corporations needed to specify their purpose as part of their chartering
documents.104
The purpose requirement was enforced through a legal action based on ultra
vires, or “beyond the powers.” Under this doctrine, shareholders could sue the
corporation if it went beyond the scope of its purpose, as established in the
charter.105 Because it limited the reach of corporate power to enumerated
purposes, the ultra vires doctrine was “an important tool to protect the state's
interest in restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect the
shareholders from managerial overreaching.”106 Cases typically involved a
corporation purchasing another company that was outside of the firm’s specified
scope or carrying on business in violation of its charter.107 In some cases,
contracts were rendered void if the one party knew that the other party was acting
ultra vires.108 This led to the odd situation of corporations seeking to escape
obligations on the grounds that they had exceeded their powers.109 Because of

104

Edward H. Warren, Executory Ultra Vires Transactions, 24 HARV. L. REV. 534,
534–35 (1911) (“But American legislatures in granting the corporate privilege, either
by special charter or pursuant to the provisions of a general law, always have been, and
still are, accustomed to incorporate any given body of associates for some, and not for
all, purposes.”).
105
Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and A Big Stick: An
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as
Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 929, 930 (2005)
(“The ultra vires doctrine historically allowed a shareholder to sue to prevent a company
from engaging in an activity outside of the specific parameters of its corporate
charter.”).
106
Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA.
L. REV. 1279, 1302 (2001).
107
See id.
108
Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires - Continuing Contract Made for an
Unauthorized Purpose, 27 HARV. L. REV. 680, 680 (1914) (finding a contract for the
sale of coal to a railroad for resale was void if the seller was chargeable with knowledge
of the railroad's unlawful purpose—namely, to resell the coal outside of its scope as a
common carrier).
109
Cf. Colo. Springs Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 F. 843, 849 (8th Cir. 1899) (“The question
concerning its power to execute the contracts is not raised by the state, but by the
corporation itself, to avoid a liability to another corporation with which it has
contracted; and for these reasons a more liberal view may be taken of its implied powers
than could otherwise be entertained.”).
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the potential for abuses under this approach, courts began to rein in the
doctrine.110
As corporations became more commonplace and less attention was paid to
the specific charters, the ultra vires doctrine began to break down. Although
ultra vires prohibitions remain on the books in almost every state,111
corporations learned to have as broad a corporate purpose as possible.112 Today,
even though corporations are allowed to have specific purposes, for-profit
companies generally follow specific language: the corporation is formed to
conduct and transact all lawful business activities allowed under the laws of the
state.113 At around the same time as ultra vires actions were disappearing, the
shareholder primacy norm was beginning to take hold. The goal of shareholder
wealth maximization became de rigueur at all corporations.114
However, there is a growing sense in much of the populace that corporations
should have goals that go beyond merely the creation of wealth for equity
110

See Editorial, Ultra Vires Contracts in the Federal Courts, 19 HARV. L. REV. 608,
609 (1906) (“In consequence there has been generally adopted a working rule . . .
making an ultra vires contract neither quite void nor voidable by any particular party,
nor yet quite good. . . . Thus a wholly executory ultra vires contract is treated as if
illegal, but if one side has performed, so that such treatment would cause hardship, a
remedy is given.”).
111
Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 105, at 945 (“The incorporation statutes of fortynine states allow these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra
vires activities--that is, activities outside of the corporation's authority.”).
112
See, e.g., Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires: What Acts Are Ultra Vires - IllDefined Objects of Incorporation, 32 HARV. L. REV. 285, 290 (1919) (discussing a
corporate purpose “enabling the company to carry on almost every conceivable kind of
business which such an organization could adopt”).
113
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618 (2017) (“[F]or-profit
corporations, including social enterprises organized as corporations, usually take
advantage of the full breadth of the permitted purposes for which a corporation can be
organized and operated under the applicable state law.”).
114
Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
2003, 2004 (2013) (“Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a
shareholder-centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes
‘maximizing shareholder value’ (typically measured by share price) over all other
corporate goals.”). See also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34
(Del. Ch. 2010) (““Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors
are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those
standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders.”).
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holders. In part, these critiques stem from alienation directed at the wealthmaximization norm, which can be viewed as sociopathic in its singlemindedness.115 But more than that, workers, consumers, and investors are
increasingly looking for more meaning in their economic activity. This new
sense of mission is manifesting itself in the growth of organic and sustainability
consumption116 and socially responsible investing.117 But increasingly, social,
economic, and environmental concerns are being brought into the corporation
itself.
One example of this shift is the growth of business organizations tailored to
include socially beneficial purposes. Benefit corporations (sometimes called B
corps) are a form of business organization created by state statutes to promote a
more socially-responsible orientation within the business.118 The signal change
115

LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST
EXPORT 168 (2001); Ian B. Lee, Is There A Cure for Corporate "Psychopathy"?, 42
AM. BUS. L.J. 65, 65 (2005) (discussing research that suggests that “the constitutive law
of corporations is responsible for a monstrous flaw in the institutional character of the
Anglo-American public corporation--specifically, its exclusive focus on profits”).
116
Jacob Bunge, Organic Food Sales Are Booming; Why Are American Farmers Crying
Foul?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-appetite-fororganic-food-prompts-jump-in-grain-imports-farmers-cry-foul-1487673002;
Jeff
Gelski, Sales growth of organic foods slips to 6.4% in 2017, FOODBUSINESS NEWS,
May 21, 2018, https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/11853-sales-growth-oforganic-foods-slips-to-64-in-2017 (noting the continuing annual growth of organic food
consumption).
117
Adam Connaker & Saadia Madsbjerg, The State of Socially Responsible Investing,
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 17, 2019, https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-state-of-sociallyresponsible-investing (noting that “[i]nvestors are increasingly conscious of the social
and environmental consequences of the decisions that governments and companies
make”). In an interesting development, employees at Amazon and Google have recently
promoted shareholder proposals to the board of directors. Kate Conger, Tech Workers
Got Paid in Company Stock. They Used It to Agitate for Change., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/technology/tech-workers-company-stockshareholder-activism.html.
118
See Matthew J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit
Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 175 (2015) (“A
benefit corporation is a for-profit corporation with a stated public benefit that operates
in a responsible and sustainable manner; in other words, it pursues the dual mission of
making a profit and achieving some social good.”). See Brett McDonnell, Benefit
Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential Failing of Delaware), 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“State statutes legally define benefit corporations.
These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, benefit
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from corporation to benefit corporation is its rejection of the shareholder
primacy norm for a more socially-beneficial corporate purpose. This purpose
must fit within the rubric of “social benefit” as defined by the state statute.
Although most states provide a relatively broad definition,119 the benefit
corporation restrains itself by opting for a purpose that can then be used as a
metric. State benefit corporation law usually includes some mechanisms for
enforcing the “benefit” component, such as benefit reporting, a benefit officer,
fiduciary duties related to the benefit, or ultra vires actions if the purpose is
ignored.120
Traditionally-organized companies are also feeling pressure to adopt
purposes and principles beyond maximizing shareholder wealth. There is, of
course, the possibility that such efforts are primarily for public relations. 121 But
there seems to be an increasing interest in authentic efforts to make a business
about more than simply making money. At companies that follow participatory
or self-managed internal governance, the purpose of the organization becomes
the core around which the organization operates.122 Corporate social
responsibility experts argue that the principles and purpose should be baked into
the corporation’s everyday operations.123 Focusing on a purpose above and
beyond shareholder returns challenges the driving spirit of shareholder
primacy.124
corporations are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business
corporation statute, except insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides different
or additional rules.”).
119
Delaware defines public benefit, as “a positive effect (or reduction of negative
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other
than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to,
effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental,
literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 362 (2016).
120
Heminway, supra note 113, at 618.
121
See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV.
983, 985 (2011) (identifying the problem of “faux CSR”).
122
See Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 635 (2018)
(discussing the role of purpose in holacratic organizations).
123
V. Kasturi Rangan, Lisa Chase & Sohel Karim, The Truth about Investors, HARV.
BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-truth-about-csr (contending that
the main goal of CSR practices should be “to align a company’s social and
environmental activities with its business purpose and values”).
124
William Bratton recently arrived at the following alternative description of corporate
law purpose:
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Principal Costs & Shareholder Disengagement

The nonvoting shares distributed in the recent Snap, Inc. initial public
offering have raised anew the wisdom of deviating from the traditional oneshare, one-vote paradigm.125 Traditionally, corporate governance advocates
have seen the one share, one vote paradigm as inviolate, and have pressured
companies to eschew dual-class or non-voting share structures. However, there
has been a recent and somewhat surprising trend towards a theoretical
justification for deviations from the one-share, one-vote scheme.
It is no accident that these arguments come at a time when investments in
massive, passive index funds is increasing apace.126 Index funds exist solely to
own shares to an established set of financially successful companies while
charging fees that are as low as possible. Any effort to investigate the issues at
play in any particular election, or—in extreme circumstances—to run and fund
a proxy challenge to incumbent directors, will cost the fund’s participants while
providing benefits to participants in the other index funds, who spend nothing.127
Such activity will redound to the detriment of the particular fund, as all funds
get the benefit but only the particular fund incurs the cost.128 In a world where
the index sets the investment portfolio, funds compete on cost, and every extra
analyst becomes an unnecessary luxury.

We set out to frame an accurate and uncontroversial statement of
purpose for corporate law. Here is the result: corporate law should
facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence
wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term investment
at the lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control
externalities. Many would expect a tighter focus on maximization, but
feasibility constraints preclude it. A more specific shareholder value
objective would be both descriptively inaccurate and controversial.
Finally, social welfare enhancement, while desirable, lies outside the
limited sphere occupied by corporate law.
William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 723–
24 (2014).
125
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y.
TIMES,
February
3,
2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evanspiegel.html.
126
Lund, supra note 6, at 494.
127
Id. at 495.
128
Id.
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The extraordinary growth of index funds causes substantial problems to a
corporate governance model based on the shareholder franchise. Voting rights
require information to be meaningful. If a voter is not informed on the choice at
hand, the voter will not make a rational choice. Either the voter will still vote,
introducing whimsy and capriciousness into the process, or the voter will
abstain. Neither option is effective if the system is built on democratic choice.
In response to these funds with large masses of insensate stocks, corporate
law scholars have pushed back against the assumptions of the traditional law and
economic model. In developing their theory of “principal costs,” Zohar Goshen
and Richard Squire argue that the field has been too focused on agency costs—
namely, the inefficiencies generated by the delegation of control from
shareholders to directors and managers.129 They point out that shareholder
governance decisions can lead to “competence costs,” arising from lack of
information or talent, and “conflict costs,” relating to the conflicts between
different goals within the shareholder group.130 Shareholders delegate their
governance authority to management in order to address these costs.131 In
particular, shareholder competence costs grow as shareholders become less
knowledgeable about the corporation and its leadership. The problem of ignorant
equity holders is so severe in Dorothy Lund’s view that she argues for regulatory
restrictions on voting rights for large, passive funds.132 Excluding their shares
from the voting pool will give a larger role to more informed and deserving
shareholders.133 If voting rights are useless or restricted, then shareholders may
begin to question their value. Nonvoting shares—an unspeakable taboo for
modern corporate law—may actually be a better deal if shareholders do not have
the information sufficient to translate their preferences into voting choices.134
These new approaches deeply unsettle shared premises of modern corporate
law theory. And they do so working within the shared normative framework of
shareholder primacy. One might expect that progressive scholars have proposed
even more radical deviations from settled corporate law doctrine. Alas, thus far,
that has not been the case.
Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 769 (using the term “agency-cost essentialists”
for scholars who “treat the reduction of agency costs as the essential function of
corporate law”).
130
Id. at 770-71.
131
Id. at 771 (“[P]rincipal costs are more fundamental than agent costs, as the goal of
reducing them is the reason that investors delegate control to managers . . . .”).
132
Lund, supra note 6, at 497.
133
Id.
134
Lund, supra note 8.
129
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D. Progressive Alternatives
In contrast to shareholder primacy, progressive corporate law theorists have
generally advocated for a stakeholder model of the corporation. Also called the
communitarian or multifiduciary model,135 stakeholder theory argues that
corporate governance should take all stakeholders in the corporate enterprise
into account, rather than limiting governance power to shareholders.136
Stakeholder reforms have generally centered around weakening shareholder
power within the organizational structure and increasing managerial discretion
to take other interests into account.137 But stakeholder theory does not provide a
stable foundation for a theory of corporate governance.
As an oppositional theory, stakeholder theory has largely served to act as a
rhetorical brake on some of the excesses of shareholder primacy.138 But it largely
reinforces the status quo. If anything, stakeholder theory expands upon the
discretion provided to the board and the management selected by the board to
follow their own judgment in contravention to the will of the shareholders. The
most important tangible contribution of stakeholder theory to corporate law has
been the constituency statute, the law in a majority of states (but not
Delaware).139 The constituency statute provides directors with the discretion to
take the interests of all stakeholders into account when making certain types of
decisions.140 Directors need not take other interests into account, and there is
135

See Simone M. Sepe, Directors' Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract, 1 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 553 (2007) (noting that “communitarians . . . advocate a multifiduciary
model where all corporate stakeholders benefit from the attribution of directors'
fiduciary duties”). See also David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law:
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 11-12
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing the use of the multifiduciary model by
communitarian corporate law scholars).
136
See Millon, supra note 135, at 11-12 (discussing efforts to provide protections to
nonshareholder constituencies); Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 293-94 (arguing that
directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the
stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise).
137
Id.
138
For a discussion of those excesses, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side
of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time
Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006).
139
Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006) (finding
that thirty-one states have constituency statutes).
140
Some are limited to takeover/mergers, while others apply to all decisions. Millon,
supra note 135, at 11-12.
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generally no remedy for other stakeholders. These statutes are just a way of
insulating directors from claims that they failed to do enough for shareholders
when contemplating a tender offer, merger, or factory shutdown.
The real problem with stakeholder theory is that it is not, at least at present,
a real theory of firm governance. Stakeholder theory lacks a model for allocating
governance rights and responsibilities among the participants.141 The theory is
more in tune with the nexus of contracts approach, as it treats all the participants
in the firm as deserving of governance consideration. However, it fails to
develop a system for managing the different stakeholders within the firm.
Stakeholder theory does not, for example, argue that corporations are simply
contractual nexuses and thus should not exist as legal entities.142 Nor, more
surprisingly, have stakeholder theorists sketched out a system whereby all
stakeholders can participate in firm governance. Instead, stakeholder theorists
have largely glommed on to the existing structure of corporate law, where
shareholders elect directors who appoint officers.143
III. THE FIRM AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
If we are to move beyond the current shareholder primacy model of
corporate governance, we need a theory of governance to ground our new
conception of the corporation. Economic theory is based, broadly, on the
principle of efficiency. But there is a subdiscipline of economics that focuses
particularly on issues of organization and governance. The literature on the

141

See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS.
ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of
mechanisms for governance, other than “balancing” stakeholder concerns); Joseph
Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 543 (2006)
(arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency risks” because of the
potential for conflicts).
142
Instead, many stakeholder theorists also ascribe to the entity view of the corporation,
which argues for treating the corporation as a state-created separate entity. Martin
Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm-from Nature to Function, 118 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1, 24 (2013) (“CSR scholars and stakeholder theorists have justified
consideration of broader stakeholder interests by characterizing the firm as not merely
a legal fiction but rather as a moral organism with social and ethical responsibilities, or
built upon the view of the corporation as an entity existing in time and as a distinct
person.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
143
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2113 (discussing examples).
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theory of the firm asks: why do we have firms, rather than markets? 144 The
theory of the firm offers a sustained interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature of
firms and their legal representations.145 While much of the current work in other
social sciences, such a psychology and sociology, dovetails with economic
theory and provides additional insights into the basic economic models,146 the
theory of the firm offers a starting point for these inquiries and a basis upon
which to build an alternative academic narrative.
A. Applying the Theory of the Firm to Corporate Governance
Research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a fundamental question:
Why do we even have firms at all? Markets allocate resources based on the best
information available at the time.147 Firms, however, operate outside of this
market structure, standing like “lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of
buttermilk.”148 The law reflects this differentiation, as market transactions are
generally governed by contract, while firms are created as specific legal entities
with their own identity—partnerships, corporations, and LLCs, among others.
Firms are meant to operate outside the market. But why?
In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite rudimentary;
the firm was simply a black box that took in inputs and produced outputs.149 No
further dissection was undertaken. However, the black box did differentiate
between what was inside the firm and what was outside: employees and capital
Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1757-65 (1989) (discussing various theories of the firm).
145
ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013);
Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1988).
146
See Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning
to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1057 (2012) (noting that “the
different social science disciplines—economics, psychology, sociology,
anthropology—are increasingly borrowing from one another and bleeding into each
other's work”). See also THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY:
RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul
S. Adler eds., 2006) (taking an organizational behavior approach).
147
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520
(1945).
148
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (quoting
D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930)).
149
Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2005) (“The
predominant model of microeconomics, neoclassical price theory, assumes simply that
the firm is a black box that maximizes profitability.”).
144
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assets were inside, while customers and suppliers were outside.150 Despite its
crude form, this conception of the firm was useful in early economic modeling
and retains that purpose even today.
An exploration of the internal workings and purpose of the firm begins with
the work of Ronald Coase.151 In an oft-quoted passage from his concise
masterpiece, The Nature of the Firm, Coase considered the firm-market
distinction:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the
market. Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated,
and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who
directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of
coordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that, if
production is regulated by price movements, production could be
carried on without any organization at all, well we might ask,
why is there any organization?152
In answering this question, Coase turned to a theory of transaction costs.
Contracting through markets and using the price mechanism can be costly. For
certain transactions, Coase posited, it is cheaper to simply direct the production
to occur rather than contracting for it each time. The hierarchy of the firm allows
such transactions to be carried out by fiat, rather than through pricing,
negotiating, and drafting a contract for each transaction.153 In other words,
hierarchical governance within the firm was more efficient than market
transactions.
Coase’s theory of the firm relies heavily on the idea of the employment
relationship. The structural differentiation between firm and market is the
relationship between individual employees and the firm’s ownership or
management. The employment relationship is not based on individual spot
transactions, but rather an ongoing organizational relationship. As Coase
famously noted: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he
does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was ordered

150

Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001).
151
Coase, supra note 148.
152
Id. at 388.
153
Id. at 390-92.
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to do so.”154 The relationship between the firm and the employee is the primary
distinction between the firm and the market. It is the reason for the firm’s
existence.
This conclusion was cemented when Coase considered “whether the
concept of a firm which has been developed fits in with that existing in the real
world.”155 His answer? “We can best approach the question of what constitutes
a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”156 He then quoted at length
from a treatise concerning the common law “control” test, which provides that
“[t]he master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally
or by another servant or agent.”157 He concluded: “We thus see that it is the fact
of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and
employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was developed
above.”158 For Coase, the employer-employee relationship defined the firm.159
Coase saw the nature of the firm as a hierarchical one in which managers
controlled the efforts of employees. But the relationship between firm and
employee need not be hierarchical. In an important response to Coase’s work,
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz also focused on the relationship of
employees with other participants within the structure of the firm. 160 However,
they argued that Coase’s focus on control, authority, and direction was
misleading.161 They put it this way, memorably: “Telling an employee to type
this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me
this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.” Because employees are

154

Id. at 387.
Id. at 403.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 404.
158
Id.
159
See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 265, 296-97 (1998).
160
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (“When a lumber mill employs
a cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a
cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across
markets (or between firms).”).
161
Id. (“To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a
deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties.”).
155
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generally hired and fired at will, neither the employer nor the employee is bound
to continue the relationship by any contractual obligations.162
Alchian and Demsetz instead took a more holistic approach, focusing on
the firm’s role in coordinating production in the midst of a variety of inputs.
Team production is what separated firms from markets. Alchian and Demsetz
defined team production as “production in which 1) several types of resources
are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating
resource.”163 As a result, team production is used when the coordinated effort
increased productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring
and disciplining the team.164
The lack of “separable outputs” is the key problem that the firm is designed
to manage. When capital providers and workers join together to carry on a
business, it is difficult to measure the relative importance or value of the
individual contributions to that business in a easily measurable and ongoing
formula. Firms allow these contributors to work together, sell their joint product,
and then use the firm to manage both responsibilities and spoils. Alchian and
Demsetz argued that a specialized, independent monitor was likely the best way
of manage these issues.165 That central monitor—the recipient of the residual
profits—would be the firm. Although Coase as well as Alchian and Demsetz
personified this monitor in the role of an “entrepreneur-coordinator,” only sole
proprietorships achieved this concentration of power. Rather than an individual,
the central component of team production would be the firm itself: a legal
“person” who contracts for all other team inputs.166 The legal entity—such as
the corporation—serves the role of coordinator.
The Alchian and Demsetz joint-production model includes employees
within the definition of the firm. Their model’s emphasis on “inputs” broadens
the scope of the firm to include investors as well as employees. Nevertheless,
the purpose of the Alchian-Demsetz firm remains the management of employees
and capital through the coordination of team production. Although they
Id. (“Long-term contracts between employer and employee are not the essence of
the organization we call a firm.”).
163
Id. at 779.
164
Id. at 780.
165
Id. at 782-83.
166
Alchian and Demsetz set forth the following characteristics of the firm: (a) joint
input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party is common to all the contracts
of the joint inputs, (d) who has the rights to renegotiate any input’s contract
independently of contracts with the other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim,
and (f) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status. Id. at 783.
162
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contribute capital, outside shareholders are relegated to the outer circles of
power, as Alchian & Demsetz express skepticism about their ability to perform
the monitoring function. They ask:
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is
one emanating from the division of ownership among several
people, or is it that the collection of investment funds from people
of various anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom voting
rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should
reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why voting rights in any
of the outside, participating investors?167
As the theory of the firm literature continued to develop, the identification
of transaction costs, monitoring costs, and team production remained central
concepts. Again, the critical question is still why some economic activities take
place in markets and others take place within firms. Using the transaction-costs
model, Oliver Williamson and others have identified the types of contractual
difficulties which are likely to lead to firm governance, rather than market
solutions.168 In situations where contributions and compensation can be harder
to define, the parties will be left with incomplete contracts that require a
governance structure to prevent opportunism.169 This opportunism will be
particularly problematic where one or both of the parties must invest significant
resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or transaction.170 This
asset specificity makes the parties susceptible to hold-ups from their contractual

167

Id. at 789 n.14.
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D.
Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the
Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008) (discussing transaction costs approach).
169
Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. 369, 373 (2005) (“Governance problems are posed when incomplete contracts (to
include unforeseen contingencies) are combined with opportunism.”).
170
George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99,
153 (2009) (“Oliver Williamson has significantly expanded upon Coase's initial insight
by discussing the importance of bundling relationship-specific assets into a firm to
avoid counterparty opportunism, and, more generally, by showing how a proper
conception of transaction costs should include both the direct costs of managing
relationships and the opportunity costs of suboptimal governance decisions.”).
168
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partners in the absence of a system of governance. Firms can be useful in
providing the structures that deter opportunism.171
The “property rights” theory of the firm, developed in a series of articles by
Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore, argues that firms are necessary
as a repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.172 By
owning the property outright, the firm prevents the problem of the commons (in
which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well as the problem
of the anticommons (in which property rights are divvied up amongst too many
disparate actors). The Grossman-Hart-Moore model dictates that those who
contribute the most valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint
enterprise should control the firm.173 They are not only most necessary to the
firm’s success; they are also the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint
enterprise moves forward in time.
In the transaction costs model, employees’ contributions must be
recognized as assets of both the firm and the employee—often described as
“human capital.” Some types of human capital are transferable, such as
education or general skills, but other types are specific to the firm and generally
worthless outside it. To the extent an employee has invested in firm-specific
skills, she is subject to opportunistic behavior, since she has little leverage to get
the full value of those skills. In the transaction-cost model, employees may be
precisely the valuable contributors to the joint enterprise who are most
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior.174

171

See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48 (1996);
Williamson, supra note 168, at 114-15.
172
See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995);
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1119 (1990).
173
D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1404–05 (2002) (“The central insight of the property rights theory of the
firm is that an appropriate allocation of ownership rights over the assets of a firm
reduces the likelihood that one party will unfairly take advantage of the other
participants within the firm.”)
174
Indeed, Margaret Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency of the
transactions costs literature has been to recognize that firm-specific human capital raises
similar questions, but then to sidestep the implications of these questions for corporate
governance.” Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the
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The “access” model defines a firm “both in terms of unique assets (which
may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who have access to these
assets.”175 Access to the unique assets is what defines the power of the
individuals within and without the firm. Rajan and Zingales define access as “the
ability to use, or work with, a critical resource.”176 Examples of critical resources
include machines, ideas, and people. As Rajan and Zingales make clear, “[t]he
agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new residual rights
of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her human capital to the
resource and make herself valuable.”177 Combined with her right to leave the
firm, access gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource that she
controls: her specialized human capital.” Control over this critical resource is a
source of power. Gordon Smith has further developed this “critical resource”
theory of the firm in outlining a theory of fiduciary duties that are responsible to
vulnerabilities created by critical resources.178
Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even further. One
aspect of this capital—knowledge—has served as the basis for a new set of
approaches to the firm.179 Knowledge is defined as both explicit sets of formal
information as well as the ability to apply a repository of unspecified information
in developing an answer or approach to a particular problem. 180 Rather than
Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 66 (Margaret M. Blair &
Mark J. Roe eds., 2000).
175
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 387, 390 (1998).
176
Id. at 388.
177
Id.
178
Smith, supra note 173, at 1404 (“[T]the critical resource theory reveals that the
beneficiary's vulnerability emanates from an inability to protect against opportunism by
the fiduciary with respect to the critical resource.”).
179
See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions, and
Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1123 (2007); Sarah Kaplan et al., Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm: A Review
and Extension, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 242 (2002). See also Katherine V.W. Stone,
Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing legal conceptions that govern the
ownership of human capital within the workplace).
180
For a discussion of explicit versus tacit knowledge, see Ikujiro Nonaka et al., A
Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: Understanding the Dynamic Process
of Creating Knowledge, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING &
KNOWLEDGE 491, 494 (Meinolf Dierkes et al. eds., 2001). Gorga and Halberstam
classify knowledge into three types: knowledge embedded in physical assets,
knowledge embedded in the organizational structure or the group of individuals that
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emphasize the ownership of physical assets, which can be fungible and nonspecific, the knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute,
and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm.181
Choices between centralized and multi-divisional organizational structures,182
or between covenants not to compete and employee stock options,183 are made
to manage the control of knowledge within the firm. Along the same lines, a
capability-based theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific knowledge and
learning that can be translated into joint production.184 Under this theory,
employees as holders of the firm’s capabilities.185
Knowledge-based theories of the firm serve as something of a bridge
between the economic, organizational, and sociological theories as to the nature
of the firm.186 Management historians such as Alfred Chandler have long
considered the actual roles of employees within the firm to be the centerpiece of
firm dynamics.187 Organizational theory has built upon these insights and carried
them over to today’s firms, which generally offer flatter hierarchical structures
and more work in teams. In fact, one set of scholars examined the role of the
firm as a “collaborative community” in which employees work together toward

constitute the firm, and specialized knowledge embedded in the individual. Gorga &
Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1141-42. As they explain, “[t]he way the firm develops
the knowledge it will use in its production process and the extent that firm can bind this
knowledge to its structure will influence its organizational structure.” Id. at 1140.
181
Id. at 1137 (criticizing the property rights theory for failing to account for the
importance of employees as assets).
182
Id. at 1173-83.
183
Id. at 1183-92. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and Boundaries of
Technology Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1686-88 (2009) (discussing the
role of covenants not to compete in managing innovation within the firm).
184
Thomas McInerney, Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 135.
185
Id.at 139.
186
See, e.g., Rajan & Zingales, supra note 175, at 424-25 (arguing that there is “ample
opportunity for gains from trade” between economics and sociology, as sociologists
have studied the role of power within organizations “in some detail”); D. Gordon Smith
& Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, (2009)
(comparing organizational theories to the traditional legal and economic theories of
contract and firm).
187
See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1-12 (1977) (discussing the role of middle- and
upper-management in coordinating large firms and their employees).
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common goals.188 Such a firm must have a shared ethos of contribution to a
collective purpose and the success of others;189 it must be structured so as to
allow for flexible organizational boundaries but highly specialized
knowledge;190 it must base status on knowledge and expertise, rather than
hierarchy;191 and it must create an identity of independence and personal
consistency.192 Such collaborative-community firms are contrasted with
hierarchical firms, which manage employees with a traditional command-andcontrol structure,193 as well as market-based firms, which break down traditional
firm barriers through outsourcing and contingent workers.194
Looking over the trajectory of the theory of the firm, we see that the primary
concern has been over the shape and internal organization for these entities that
sit outside of the standard market relationships. And the theories of the firm all
seem to acknowledge the important role of workers within the firm. Going back
to Coase, the firm was designed to manage the relationship between those who
started or managed the business and those who worked for the business. The
work of the business was best managed internally, rather than through external
markets. And the firm itself was made up of those who worked for the firm,
along with a nebulous collection of those who “managed” the firm—also
workers—and those who “owned” the firm through financial assests.
B. The Legal Construction of Firm Governance
Because the firm is the primary organizational engine of economic activity
and growth, the internal governance of the firm takes on supreme importance.
Of course, the story of modern corporate law is the systematic exclusion of
employees from governance. But this model is not endemic to economic
organization. Partnerships, for example, were the original legal structure for
organizing a group of people into a firm. Unlike corporations, partnerships have

188

See Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in THE
FIRM AS COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006)
189
Id. at 39-43.
190
Id. at 44.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 54-59
193
Id. at 64-65 (discussing the Wal-Mart approach).
194
Id.
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never required an explicit grant of authority from the government to operate.195
Instead, individuals took it upon themselves to form a partnership under the
basic guidelines set forth in the law. In addition, courts can determine that a
group of people had been operating as a partnership, even if they had never
declared themselves to be partners or considered themselves to be within a
partnership.196 Instead, the test is whether the parties had formed “an association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”197 There
are numerous examples of situations where people working together on the
assumption that the worker was an employee turned out to be partners according
to a court.198
Under the default rules of a partnership, all participants have equal voting
rights and equal rights to vote on partnership matters.199 The control rights in a
partnership extend even to ordinary, everyday matters of the business.200 Of
course, “one partner, one vote” is only the default rule. Partners who
contemplate varying levels of input and interest will generally construct a
partnership agreement that allocates votes as well as shares of the residual profits
according to mutual agreement.201 Partners are free to divvy up voting power
according to contributions, seniority, experience, involvement, and other factors
relevant to governance. The default rules are a bit more structured for the limited
partnership, the limited liability partnership, and the limited liability company.
These organizations envision participants with stakes in the residual who do not
participate in management. For example, limited partnerships must make clear
195

See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 53
(2004) (“[N]o formalities are required to form a partnership.”); Christine Hurt,
Partnership Lost, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 497 (2019) (“Partnerships existed at
common law in England and in the United States before partnership acts were
promulgated in the 1800s.”).
196
See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that “it is not
essential that the parties actually intend to become partners.”).
197
Unif. P'ship Act § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P'ship Act § 202(a)
(amended 1997).
198
See, e.g., Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. 2009); Holmes v. Lerner, 74
Cal. App. 4th 442 (1999); Smith v. Redd, 593 So. 2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1991);
199
Unif. P'ship Act § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P'ship Act § 401(f)
(amended 1997).
200
See Unif. P'ship Act § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P'ship Act § 401(j)
(amended 1997).
201
See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D.D.C. 1975) (discussing
how “statutory rules governing the rights and duties of the partners are ‘subject to any
agreement between them.”’).
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who the managerial partners are, and who the limited partners are. 202 Limited
liability companies have what is known as “chameleon” management: “the firm
can choose either direct partnership-type control by the members or centralized
control by managers that is closer to, but not as rigid as, the limited partnership
format.”203 Participants in these enterprises have substantial flexibility in
arranging the division of ownership and control rights.
The corporation, in contrast, requires a specific charter from a state
government to exist and has a fairly uniform governance structure replicated
across the United States. The shareholders elect the board of directors, and the
board appoints the officers who run the corporation. Because the legal corporate
form controls the governance for the economic firm, the two have come to seem
coterminous. But the corporation represents a shareholder-oriented governance
structure—one that leaves out other participants. In smaller corporations known
as closely-held corporations, the same basic corporate structure is used.204
Because the corporate form’s rigidity does not overlap with the firm, these
businesses must adapt the corporate form for their purposes. Many closely-held
companies have different classes of shares as a method of allocating control
amongst different groups of shareholders.205 In addition, shareholders may agree
to certain voting arrangements, such as the pooling of votes into a voting trust
or agreeing to vote along certain lines.206 These voting arrangements are often
executed to consolidate a group of disparate shareholders into a majority or to

202

See Rev. Unif. Ltd. P'ship Act § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (1995).
However, under the original Uniform Limited Partnership Act, limited partners may be
subject to liability as managing partners if they participate in the governance. Unif. Ltd.
P'ship Act § 7 (1916), 6A U.L.A. 336 (1995) (“A limited partner shall not become liable
as a general partner unless ... he takes part in the control of the business.”).
203
Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 843 (2001).
204
See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(Mass. 1975) (defining closely held corporations as having “(1) a small number of
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority
stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the
corporation.”).
205
Preferred stock is particularly common in start-up corporations. Venture capital
investors prefer to invest with preferred stock, which converts into common stock with
multiple voting shares if certain triggers are reached. William W. Bratton, Venture
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV.
891, 892 (2002) (noting that “[c]onvertible preferred stock is the dominant financial
contract in the venture capital market.”).
206
See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 486-96 (2000).
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provide protection to minority shareholders over certain critical matters.207
Corporate law generally protects minority shareholders against undue
oppression through specifically-tailored equitable relief. Such oppression often
relates to the ability of minority shareholders to partake in other aspects of the
corporate pie—namely, employment.208 Even if shareholders are all sharing
equally in the profits, the minority oppression doctrine may still order the
majority shareholders to approve a dividend or to provide employment
opportunities within the company for minority shareholders.209
This divergence between the cookie-cutter structure of corporation
governance and the more tailored approaches of other systems suggests that
corporations could reconsider their lockstep approach. And in fact, recent
developments in shareholding structures illustrate a breakdown in the one-share,
one-vote consensus model. Companies such as Facebook, Google, and the New
York Times have stock structures that grant the company founders special
control rights beyond their number of common stock shares. 210 Preferred stock
is also used to provide control rights in certain circumstances, such as the failure
to make a payment or the approach of the company’s dissolution.211 Companies

207

Perhaps the most famous example of such a trust involves the Ringling family of
circus fame. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947)
(upholding such a trust).
208
See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)
(finding “no legitimate business purpose” to the majority's decision to suspend a
minority shareholder's salary, fail to reelect him as a director, and fail to appoint him as
an officer); Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 379 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2002) (minority shareholder terminated from his position as treasurer by
majority shareholders).
209
For a further discussion of the protection of minority shareholders vis-à-vis the
protection of political minorities, see Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and
Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003).
210
Lund, supra note 8.
211
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 66-67 (2002)
(“[P]referred stock may have a preference over common stock with respect to dividends
and/or liquidation”). Preferred shares have often been ignored in the debate about
shareholder wealth maximization, with the assumption that the shareholders in question
are the common stock holders. See id. at 66 (noting that preferred stock is “an odd beast,
neither wholly fish nor wholly fowl”); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A
Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1820 (2013) (“Preferred stock sits
on a fault line between two great private law paradigms, corporate law and contract law.
It is neither one nor the other; rather, it draws on both.”).
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are getting creative in order to accommodate the special circumstances of their
particular business firm.212
More broadly, corporate law needs to dig deeper into the theory of the firm.
It needs to reexamine the premise that corporate governance is only about
shareholders, directors, and officers. In particular, corporate law policymakers
and theorists need to look at all of the corporation’s stakeholders and determine
if governance rights are appropriate as a way of managing their preferences.
Prior to recent proposed legislation,213 the corporate law community has not
seriously entertained any significant changes to the corporate franchise. Even
those commentators who have suggested a team-production model of corporate
governance have only asked the board to directors to consider the interests of
stakeholders.214 With the power structures already in place, it makes little sense
to imagine a stakeholder-rights theory without any positive governance power
for stakeholders. As Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has
emphasized:
Under the DGCL [Delaware General Corporate Law] only
stockholders have the right to vote for directors; approve
certificate amendments; amend the bylaws; approve certain other
transactions, such as mergers, and certain asset sales and leases;
and enforce the DGCL’s terms and hold directors accountable for
honoring their fiduciary duties. In the corporate republic, no
constituency other than stockholders is given any power.215

See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 773 (“[B]ecause the impact of a given
governance structure on control costs is firm-specific, there is no particular governance
structure that can be described as intrinsically good, bad, welfare enhancing, or
inefficient.”).
213
See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work
Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
214
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61.
215
Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763–66 (2015); see also
Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That for-Profit
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135–36 (2012) (“[T]he
continued failure of our societies to be clear-eyed about the role of the for-profit
corporation endangers the public interest.”).
212
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Voting rights are the only way to provide a real voice to preferences within the
corporation’s governance structure.216
C. A Mutual-Control Model of the Firm
1. Participation in Joint Production
Corporations exist to facilitate economic production.217 The corporate form
is not the same thing as a business; an actual business consists of ideas,
relationships, economic activity, and legal rights. The corporate form is part of
this mix.218 The corporation is a legal fiction that creates rights and duties; the
business firm is the ongoing social phenomenon that we think of when we
consider companies like Apple, Facebook, and Ford. The legal part of the
business equation is meant to facilitate the social and economic phenomenon.
The economic distribution of the responsibilities for production, as well as
the distribution of the fruits of production, will ultimately rest in the hands of
those with organizational power. Much of the debate in corporate law over the
last forty years—perhaps even the last century—has concerned the distribution
of corporate power between the board, the officers, and the shareholders.219
Shareholder advocates have pushed for corporate law reforms that provide more
direct power to stockholders.220 On the other side, management and stakeholder
advocates have argued that boards need more insulation from shareholders and
more unreviewable discretion, even if their ultimate aims remain shareholder
216

D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1458 (2002) (contemplating that “the key residual ownership right in the
corporation is the right to elect directors”).
217
RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 4 (“The corporation undeniably has driven business
growth in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.”).
218
William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (suggesting that “the most useful way to
analyze the modern business enterprise is to interpret the terms of the economic
arrangements of a firm (partnership, corporation, cooperative) and the terms of the
related economic arrangements that should not be analyzed separately from the firm
(distributorship, loan agreement, employment contracts) as a series of bargains subject
to constraints and made in contemplation of a long-term relationship”).
219
For the beginnings of the debate over the separation of ownership and control, see
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932). See also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64 (discussing the problem
of agency costs in light of the separation of ownership and control).
220
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 57.
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wealth maximization.221 In this second group, there is a subset of advocates who
argue that stakeholders such as employees, creditors, consumers, and
communities deserve some protection within the process.222 But stakeholder
supporters generally provide directors with the freedom to merely consider all
stakeholder interests, rather than granting voting power to these stakeholders.223
If the firm is designed to help manage a system of joint production, then the
governance of the firm should include those who participate in the joint
production. The distinction between markets and firms is this distinction
between the use of straightforward contracts to manage relationships and the
need for governance mechanisms to manage relationships. 224 Firms involve the
complexities of ongoing joint production between participants who cannot
reduce their interactions simply to contractual performance metrics. Instead, the
participants create another entity—the firm—to serve as the locus of their
production and to structure both the inputs required by the participants and to
divvy up the outputs amongst them.
Shareholders and employees are invested in the firm in such a way that they
need firm governance to protect against opportunism. When it comes to their
contractual vulnerability, shareholders are in fact situated differently from other
capital providers (such as creditors).225 Shareholders invest their money into the
firm with no ability to withdraw it and subject to uncertain payoffs, largely at
the discretion of management.226 Employees are also firm investors. They have
invested their labor, reputations, and firm-specific individual capital in the firm

221

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 550; Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 754 (2007); Lynn A. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804–05 (2007).
222
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 313.
223
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2113 (discussing the “strange turn” against
stakeholder board representation).
224
See Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 80
(1999) (“When contracts are incomplete in the sense that they cannot incorporate all
future contracting opportunities, governance becomes consequential.”).
225
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 68–69; Benjamin Means, A
Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161,
1197 (2010) (discussing the problem of “shareholder oppression” and vulnerability, and
the inability of contracts to unequivocally protect such shareholders).
226
See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392 (2003)
(citing the importance of “resource commitment” or capital lock-in as a critical reason
for the success of the corporation as a private enterprise).
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and cannot not pull these investments out.227 Under the law, they are
compensated on a more regular basis, and with less discretion, than
shareholders.228 However, they still operate within the firm, as opposed to
suppliers and outside contractors who provide their services through markets.229

227

See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,
302 (1998) (noting that firm-specific skills “make a worker more valuable to her present
employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm’s opportunistic behavior”);
Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 368 (2010) (“For instance, employees may make an
investment in corporations by way of undergoing specialised training that might not be
able to be used elsewhere in other employment.”).
228
As late as the nineteenth century, employees worked for terms as long as a year and
were not entitled to any contractual payment if they left before the end. See, e.g., Stark
v. Parker, 19 Mass. 267, 292–94 (1824) (denying any contractual recovery for an
employee who left after nine months of a twelve-month job); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H.
481, 491–92 (1834) (denying contractual recovery but allowing for recovery under
restitution). Now, however, wage and hour laws require payment for time worked and
periodic payments made to the employee. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(2012)).
229
There may be certain exceptions in unusual situations. See HANSMANN, supra note
87, at 149–223 (discussing specific instances of customer-owned enterprises); David G.
Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253 (2009)
[hereinafter Yosifon, Consumer Interest] (arguing that consumers are inadequately
represented in corporate governance); David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the
Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon,
Lock-in] (concluding that “a departure from the shareholder wealth maximization norm
and an embrace of a multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime may be necessary
to overcome agency problems associated with consumer lock-in”).
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The theory of the firm supports a governance model that includes
employees. Theory of the firm scholars have long appreciated the importance of
the employee to our conception of the firm.230 In fact, Ronald Coase looked to
the relationship between employer and employee to demonstrate empirical
support for his theory of the firm.231 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz argued
that the importance of the firm (as separate from the market) stems from the need
to coordinate production from a variety of inputs.232 Team production is used—
and firms replace markets—when the coordinated effort increases productivity,
after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the
team.233 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout relied on this notion of team production
in developing their stakeholder-based theory.234 But the non-separable inputs
within team production really belong to employees and shareholders.235
230

See generally Coase, supra note 148, at 401–05.
See id. at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and
servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”).
232
See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 160, at 778 (describing the firm as a “centralized
contractual agent in a team production process”).
233
Id. at 780.
234
See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 275 (analyzing the “team production problem”
arising “when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific resources to produce a
nonseparable output”).
235
See id. at 249 (“If the team members’ investments are firm-specific . . . and if output
from the enterprise is nonseparable, . . . serious problems can arise in determining how
any economic surpluses generated by team production . . . should be divided.”).
231
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Shareholders provide capital that is taken within the firm and turned into
discretionary funds.236 Employees work together under the aegis of the firm to
produce goods or services in a manner that generally cannot be separated out to
assign specific values.237 Other participants are not integrated into the team
production process, and, thus, do not need to work within the firm.238 Creditors
provide money on fixed terms.239 Suppliers and independent contractors provide
specific services outside of the firm’s scope. Consumers purchase the goods or
services after the production process is complete.240 And the surrounding
community regulates the firm as it does all other individuals and organizations
within its jurisdiction. If we say that all of these participants are engaged in the
production process, it proves too much—then all participants in the market
would be engaged in commerce with one another. It is only when we have a
team production process—when the parties cannot effectively use the market—
that we need to create a firm and facilitate the process of team production.241
Employees and shareholders are part of that team production process in a way
that stakeholders outside the firm are not.242
See id. at 277 (“Providers of financial capital—shareholders and even, potentially,
some creditors—are, by this agreement, just as ‘stuck’ in the firm as are providers of
specialized human capital.”).
237
Id. at 261.
238
See id. at 269 (arguing that “employees, shareholders, and executives” are the main
players on the corporate “team”).
239
But cf. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1652–55 (2002) (arguing that “[t]here is
no doubt that creditors who loan money to publicly held corporations thereby make a
team-specific investment” but that they are “less vulnerable to opportunism when
trading with publicly held corporations” when compared to other team members).
240
See Yosifon, Consumer Interest, supra note 229, at 259 (discussing the cabined role
of some consumers in the transacting process).
241
See id. at 265 (“If the activities and inputs of those participants are adequately
coordinated, their collective output can be qualitatively different and vastly larger than
the sum of what each individual could produce separately.”).
242
Some stakeholder theorists have advocated specifically for employee governance
rights. GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 112 (advocating for a special role for employees
in corporate law, including the possibility of board representation); Brett H. McDonnell,
Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
429, 430–31 (2011) (evaluating “a number of possible strategies for creating a role for
employees in corporate governance”); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy,
or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334
(2008) (promoting employee primacy); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
236
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Concern for the fates of other stakeholders is understandable and may, in
some circumstances, warrant a species of governance protection.243 Creditors,
for example, may receive specific protections when the company is close to
bankruptcy as a way of mitigating their particular vulnerabilities in such
situations.244 Certain consumers may have the type of long-term, invested
interests, such that some governance and/or ownership rights may make
sense.245 In the main, however, government regulation will be the most
straightforward way of managing issues that arise and are not amenable to
contractual resolution. Creditors have statutory rights within bankruptcy.246
Consumer protection laws can place mandatory terms or disclosure requirements

Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the
American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000).
Others have noted that employees have a stronger or the strongest case amongst
stakeholders for participation in governance. Millon, supra note 135, at 14 (noting that
“[t]he most compelling theoretical arguments for nonshareholder protection have
focused on employees,” and that “the relative inadequacy of bargaining power and other
disadvantages may more seriously impede bargained-for protection for employees than
for other nonshareholder groups”).
243
See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 275 (“[T]he public corporation is not so much a
‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments,’ in
which several different groups contribute unique and essential resources to
the corporate enterprise, and who each find it difficult to protect their contribution
through explicit contracts.”).
244
See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an
End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 296 (2015) (“[C]ourts should revert to their traditional
focus on policing against the bargaining failures that can occur when investors use
directors to address the incomplete contracting challenges that are replete in corporate
finance.”); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of
Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 119 (2009)
[hereinafter Tung, Leverage] (arguing that “bank creditors and other private lenders
often enjoy significant oversight and influence over managerial decisions”). For a
discussion of the possible expansion of fiduciary duties to creditors, see Frederick Tung,
The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57
EMORY L.J. 809, 814–15 (2008) [hereinafter Tung, Fiduciary Duties].
245
See HANSMANN, supra note 87, at 149–68 (discussing consumer ownership);
Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 229, at 1449–59 (discussing types of lock-in situations).
246
See Tung, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 244, at 842 (“By the time the firm is in
distress, its creditors will enjoy differing rights (including payment and priority rights),
differing stakes in the continuation of the borrower firm, and differing contract
protections.”).
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on firms.247 Environmental protections address externalities by imposing costs
on firms (and individuals) for creating those externalities.248 But corporate
governance, like all firm governance, should be addressed to solving problems
that arise within the firm structure—problems related to team production.249
Employees and shareholders are engaged in the process of team production
within the firm.250
2.

Information within the Firm

A mutual-control model of firm governance better reflects the flow of
information within the firm. Information has always been the strange paradox at
the heart of corporate law theory. Shareholders delegate governance power to
management because they do not have the time or resources to get the
information necessary to make independent governance decisions. And yet
shareholder primacy asks shareholders to vote with sufficient knowledge and
understanding to curb agency costs and direct the corporation efficiently. This
paradox has come into fuller view of late, as theorists raise powerful concerns

247

Cf. Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1147, 1169 (2010) (“Despite the many state and federal statutes that have been
enacted in the last forty years to regulate consumer transactions, the underlying contract
between the company and the consumer remains crucial in determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties.”).
248
Individual shareholders at individual companies can no doubt use corporate law and
governance to advance environmental concerns. See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the
Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (“In light of the
significant impact that firms can have on the environment (often, though not always,
when they are organized as publicly traded corporations), this Article argues that the
law governing the corporation throughout its life cycle—corporate law, securities
regulation, antitrust law, and bankruptcy law—should be understood as a fundamental
part of environmental law.”).
249
See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 250 (“[P]ublic corporation law can offer a
second-best solution to team production problems because it allows rational individuals
who hope to profit from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by
opting into an internal governance structure we call the ‘mediating hierarchy.’”).
250
Note that a mutual-control governance structure for the firm would still align with
William Bratton’s description of the corporate purpose: “corporate law should facilitate
corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence wealth) in a competitive
economy, encouraging long-term investment at the lowest cost of capital, subject to
exterior regulations that control externalities.” Bratton, supra note 124, at 723–24.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

52

Law Review

[Vol. 100

about the “competence costs” of principal governance251 and the voting rights of
passive funds.252
Employees have information about the firm that they obtain through their
everyday experience with the company without additional cost. Yet they have
no formal governance mechanisms for using this information to help guide the
company. The overwhelming majority of private sector employees are not
represented by a union.253 Even if employees are represented by a union, that
union has not formal right to bargain with the company over issues of managerial
prerogative, such as new product lines, marketing, acquisitions, or the
composition of the board.254 The formal mechanism for employee input is the
proverbial suggestion box.
In the 1980s and 1990s, both academic and popular business literature
explored ways in which firms could better process and utilize information held
by employees.255 The success of Japanese businesses led many to investigate
ways in which Japanese firms better integrated employee decisionmaking.256
Internal systems involving “quality circles” and “quality improvement teams”

251

Goshen & Squire, supra note 7.
Lund, supra note 6.
253
Union Member Summary, BUREAU L. STAT. (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that 6.4% of private-sector
employees are unionized).
254
Employers only need to bargain about terms and conditions of employment; they
need not discuss areas within the “core of entrepreneurial control.” NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (discussing the mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE,
LABOR LAW 134-39 (2016).
255
For a sampling of the legal academic literature—much of it involving employee
ownership—see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (1995); THE NEW
RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (Margaret M. Blair
& Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000); JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP:
REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? (1988); HANSMANN, supra note 87, at 66-119; SAUL A.
RUBENSTEIN & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, LEARNING FROM SATURN: POSSIBILITIES FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (2001); PAUL WEILER,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990); Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership,
67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 160 (1991).
256
See, e.g., ROBERT E. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1980); Jon Gertner,
From 0 to 60 to World Domination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007 (Magazine), at 34.
252
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were heralded as a way of drawing employee know-how into daily operations.257
Such methods stood in opposition to hierarchical management structures and the
Taylorist method of production, which held that managers generated the
information and disseminated it down the ladder.258 Although many of these
structures are in use today,259 they almost always do not extend power to the
higher reaches of the corporation, where true power sits.
This gap between knowledge on the employees’ part and power on the
shareholders’ part seems inefficient. Shareholders and employees could work
together to pool their information and their power to police decisions of
management. To take just one example: the process of carrying out a corporate
combination, such as a merger or sale of substantially all assets, generally
follows a prescribed pattern. After some set of the top corporate officers agree
to the deal, the companies must secretly and expeditiously conduct due diligence
using high-level management and outside consultants. If this hastily-conducted
due diligence uncovers no problems, the boards approve the combination and
announce the deal to the public and shareholders. The shareholders generally
have a couple months to digest the proxy materials and media reports before
they vote to approve or quash the merger. If the combination receives
shareholder and regulatory approval, the combination ultimately goes into
effect.260 There are strategic reasons for the structure of this process: secrecy
prevents poaching and keeps failed negotiations under the rug.261 While this
secrecy serves a purpose, it also narrowly restricts both the information and the
perspectives that can be brought to bear. As a result, corporate combinations are
extremely top-down affairs. From start to finish, the typical corporate
257

See, e.g., JOSEPH M. JURAN, QUALITY BY DESIGN (1992); DAVID I. LEVINE,
REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN
(1995); PAUL LILLRANK & NORIAKI KANO, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT: QUALITY
CONTROL CIRCLES IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1989); Erin White, How a Company Made
Everyone a Team Player, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2007, at B1.
258
See Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing
Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 143-46 (1988)
(discussing Taylorism in the workplace).
259
New managerial methodologies providing for participatory management and
employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe. See, e.g., LALOUX, supra
note 13; ROBERTSON, supra note 13.
260
For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the AOL-Time Warner merger,
see Matthew T. Bodie, AOL-Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy,
31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006).
261
See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the
importance of keeping merger negotiations secret).
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combination is hampered by the absence of critical information. Employees are
a natural fit to help overcome this information deficit—they have specialized
information from the shop floor that is often undervalued by expensive corporate
consultants.262
Employees also have information about the agency costs associated with
managerial opportunism—information that shareholders are not likely to have.
While directors may be expected to police such opportunism, there are a variety
of reasons to doubt their effectiveness. First, the directors themselves may be in
on the deal; the firm may decide to award bonuses to directors as well as
managers.263 Second, directors may already feel beholden to managers. Toplevel executives have significant power over the board nomination and
reelection process264 as well as the directorial compensation process.265 Personal
ties help cement the feelings of loyalty and friendship.266 Third, directors are
part-timers; they themselves do not have the same quantity and depth of
information that employees have. Boards may end up trusting that investment
bankers, compensation consultants, and other advisors have dealt with the
compensation issue sufficiently, when in fact these advisors have their own set
of conflicts.267
262

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL
DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 231-36 (1984) (discussing the practice of
“flexible specialization” on the shop floor). See also MIKE ROSE, THE MIND AT WORK:
VALUING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE AMERICAN WORKER xxxiv (2004) (discussing the
various intelligences of different types of workers).
263
See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 331-33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the issues
surrounding a stock option grant to directors).
264
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25-27 (2004).
265
Id. at 27-31 (discussing how top-level managers can financially reward directors).
266
Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of
Directors, and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4
INDUS. & CORP CHANGE 292 (1995).
267
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 264, at 37-39. See also In re Walt Disney
Shareholders’ Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 704-11 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006) (discussing the process through which Michael Ovitz was hired by Walt Disney
in 1995). Despite denying the duties of care and good faith challenge against the Ovitz
hiring, Chancellor Chandler acknowledged that “the compensation committee met for
one hour” to discuss the terms of Michael Ovitz’s compensation along with the
compensation packages for various Disney employees, 121 stock option grants, toplevel executive Robert Iger's employment agreement, and board member and
compensation committee chair Irwin Russell's $250,000 compensation for negotiating
the Ovitz deal. Id. at 708 (emphasis in the original).
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Employees are ideally situated to join with shareholders in an effort to
police management. Indeed, this already appears to be taking place. Labor
unions, for example, have become much more involved in traditional corporate
governance activism.268 In the 1980s, unions were generally antagonistic to
shareholder concerns and supported anti-takeover tactics such as constituency
statutes.269 However, unions and union-associated pension funds have joined the
side of shareholders in pushing through shareholder-friendly corporate
governance measures.270 Pension fund managers have been at the forefront in
governance efforts to strengthen shareholder voting rights, 271 rein in the power
of the CEO,272 and fight fraud and abuse by insiders.273 These measures suggest
an ongoing role for union activism: an alliance with shareholders in an effort to
maximize long-term growth for shareholders and other stakeholders. Employee
board representation would provide a conduit for this kind of agency-costs
information for the 93 percent of private-sector employees who are not
represented by a union.274 Regardless of their situation, employees have an
interest in working with shareholders to prevent executives from taking
advantage of the other stakeholders in the company.
D. Outside the Firm: Stakeholder Theory
Those who are outside the firm should not participate in governance. They
may, of course, participate in the joint production, but they participate through
markets—their interests are reducible to contractual performance. Creditors
provide capital, but they do so under very different terms than shareholders.
While shareholders provide funds with no expectation of repayment, creditors
have a contractual right to repayment, generally with interest, and may also have
secured rights to property interests if the loan is not repaid per the terms.
268

See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998).
269
Id. at 1036.
270
Id. at 1045. (“The amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder proposals
is how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any institutional investor.”). See
generally DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER:
LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018).
271
WEBBER, supra note 270, at 45-78.
272
Id. at 111-51.
273
Id. at 164-80.
274
Union Member Summary, BUREAU L. STAT. (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that 6.4% of private-sector
employees are unionized).
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Suppliers and independent contractors may provide goods or services that are
used within the process of joint production. But their contributions are discrete
and can be completed on the market. Moreover, these goods or services are often
provided in the context of a separate firm—one that exists apart from the firm at
issue. A painting contractor could not operate without buying the pain from a
supplier, but that supplier is itself a firm that makes and sells paints to a variety
of customers. That does not make the supplier a part of the painting contractor’s
firm. All of the economy is interwoven, but we still can draw a distinction
between firms and markets. This dichotomy between firm and market may elide
greater complexity in relationships, as recent examinations of joint ventures and
“braided” contracts has revealed.275 But complications in categorization do not
mean that the separate categories do not exist.
This largely delineated dichotomy between firms and markets has been
complicated in corporate law by the background burbling of stakeholder theory
as an alternative to shareholder primacy. Stakeholder theory, remember, holds
that corporate governance should take all stakeholders in the corporate
enterprise into account.276 But it lacks a model for allocating governance rights
and responsibilities among the participants.277
Stakeholder theory could develop a new system of corporate governance
giving all stakeholders direct ways to participate in firm governance. But the
theory would have to do the difficult work of assigning rights to all participants
in a meaningful way—beyond the contractual protections they already hold. The
whole point of firm governance is to move beyond contract.278 Yet stakeholder
theory seems content with the current power structure, as long as directors do
not get too beholden to their electorate. This approach is not internally coherent.
275

See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sable & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction
of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1377, 1382 (2010); see also Geis, supra note 170, at 100.
276
See Millon, supra note 135, at 11–12 (discussing efforts to provide protections to
nonshareholder constituencies); Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 293–94 (arguing that
directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the
stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise).
277
See Joseph Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533,
543 (2006) (arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency risks”
because of the potential for conflicts); Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in
Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory
fails to provide a system of mechanisms for governance, other than “balancing”
stakeholder concerns).
278
See Coase, supra note 148, at 391–93 (discussing why production is organized
through firms, rather than markets).
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It makes little sense to attack shareholder primacy but then maintain the
exclusive shareholder franchise.279 Stakeholder theory has failed to present a
viable alternative to the status quo/shareholder primacy model; at best, it
advocates for a watered-down version of shareholder primacy.
Some stakeholder theorists argue that a stakeholder approach is the best
way to incorporate community or societal interests within firm governance.
However, the community has a more powerful tool than firm governance for
influencing the firm: regulation. Governments can place restrictions on firms
that manage their behavior regardless of their internal governance structure.
Society has tools far more powerful than a voice within the governance structure.
And because society has interests that transcend firm boundaries, it does not
have a first-order set of interests in the allocation of the responsibilities and
benefits of joint production of a particular firm. It is not surprising that
stakeholder theorists provide no real participation mechanism for society within
firm governance—merely a vague commendation to the board to take societal
interests into account.
There may be certain circumstances in which a particular stakeholder may
be sufficiently enmeshed in the workings of the firm, or may be particularly
vulnerable to opportunism, that firm governance rights would better manage the
relationship between the firm and the stakeholder.280 However, as a matter of
course, only shareholders and employees participate in the firm in a way that
should entitle them to governance rights.
IV. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
AND THE MUTUAL-CONTROL MODEL
When it comes to the corporate franchise, the theory of the firm provides a
solid economic foundation for separating the interests of shareholders and
employees from those of other corporate constituents. It is not, however, the
only theoretical justification for that separation. In this part, we explore the
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2113 (discussing the “strange turn” from
stakeholder theory to the exclusive shareholder franchise). Stakeholder theorists have
acknowledged this difficulty. See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 312 (“Recognizing
that shareholder voting rights can act as a safety net to protect against extreme
misconduct poses something of a problem for the mediating hierarchy approach, as it
suggests that shareholders enjoy more control over how the firm is run than do other
members of the coalition.”).
280
For a discussion of various ownership structures for different types of firms, see
HANSMANN, supra note 87.
279
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lessons that democratic theory has to offer to corporate governance. In
particular, we look at governance from the broad perspective of preference
aggregation and develop a theory of democratic participation that allows us to
determine whose preferences are best captured through voting rather than
contract. We then apply that framework to corporate governance and find that
it, too, counsels in favor of a mutual-control model.
A. Corporations and Democracy
All of the institutions that comprise modern market-based societies—from
large governments to small businesses—employ decisionmaking structures
designed to take account of the preferences of their constituents. They
sometimes rely upon compacts or contracts, which are thought to ensure the
preference satisfaction of everyone involved.281 Once institutions reach a certain
size and complexity, though, contracts alone cannot do the job: they must resort
to some type of voting mechanism to aggregate preferences. This is true of
almost all institutions, both political and corporate, that claim to serve some sort
of constituency. It is certainly true of the modern corporation.
Since corporate governance involves, at least in part, the use of voting
mechanisms to aggregate preferences, it seems reasonable to turn to political
theory in analyzing its structures and relationships. Public choice theory, with
its emphasis on the interests of different groups and its analysis of the effect of
different structures on outcomes, would seem to present a natural methodology
for studying corporate governance.282 More generally, political theory concerns
the allocation and transfer of power in decisionmaking and the roles of different
institutions in the governance of a polity. That said, economics, so far, has
dominated corporate law to the almost complete exclusion of political theory,
perhaps because corporate law theorists are sometimes suspicious of political
analogies (despite borrowing what they think is useful).283 And while we
281

See, e.g., Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in Corporate
Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239, 248–49 (2010).
282
See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(1991).
283
See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 256-57, 323-24; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the
Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129 (2009) (discussing how economic theory
has dominated corporate law and arguing that political theory should play a larger role).
Public choice theory has been used in corporate law in the context of competition
between states, competition within states, and competition between the states
(particularly Delaware) and the federal government. See, e.g., RALPH WINTER,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

2020]

RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION

59

obviously think economics has its place in the discussion, politics may also be
instructive at the fundamental level of the structure of the corporation.
This is not to say that political and corporate institutions, or political and
corporate voting, are the same thing. For example, those who currently vote in
corporate elections—shareholders—may enter and exit the corporation more
freely than citizens can move between polities; and shareholder voting, as
currently structured, is a relatively meaningless exercise in terms of exerting
influence over most corporate decisions.284 These points are well taken. But at
some level of generality, both types of institutions purport to have governance
structures designed to aggregate preferences. The purpose of a system of
governance is to manage different interests despite the opportunities for
conflict.285
For that reason, examining how voting works in political institutions may
help illuminate some of the arguments around corporate governance. The
disagreements over corporate governance law, after all, aren’t usually about
whether corporations should be structured to maximize the preference
satisfaction of their constituents, broadly defined, but how best to do so. The
same types of questions animate discussions of both political and corporate
voting. One central set of questions, of course, is which constituents count, and
how do we identify them and best capture their preferences? But there are other,
related questions as well. Should the voting system be direct, representative, or
some mixture of the two? If representative, what is the basis for representation,
and how responsive should the system be? Questions like these have been the
subject of a lot of thought and experience in the political realm; that work can
help us think about the structure of governance within the corporation.

GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV.
469, 469-73 (1987); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493
(2005).
284
Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy,
63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1397-1404 (2006).
285
FEDERALIST TEN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS 43 (Gary Wills, ed. 1982) (defining faction as “a number of
citizens amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”).
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Interested Parties

Systems that aggregate preferences typically limit input to people who have
a stake or interest in the enterprise.286 When possible, the degree of input should
be calibrated with the weight of that interest, or the strength of those
preferences.287 We aggregate the preferences of interested parties to ensure more
thoughtful decisionmaking and lend a measure of legitimacy to electoral
outcomes.288 And, indeed, most discussions of governance systems—corporate
and political—take it for granted that input should be limited to those with an
interest in the enterprise.289 After that, though, the disagreements start almost
immediately. They resolve into a couple different issues. First, who has interests
that are sufficiently substantial to merit some kind of input into the future of the
enterprise? Second, how are those interests best captured: through mutual
agreement, voting, or some mixture of the two?290
The modern corporate structure dictates that the shareholders have their
preferences captured through voting—primarily by voting on boards of
directors, but also, in some cases like mergers or dissolutions, more directly—
and all other constituents, from employees to suppliers to customers, have their
preferences captured largely through individual agreements.291 From the
perspective of preference aggregation, voting is used to capture an ongoing set
of preferences that are then translated into a system of governance for the firm.
As an institutional entity, it needs a process whereby it can make decisions,
effectuate actions, and carry on business. The shareholders have been designated
as the body politic whose preferences are collated through various voting
procedures.
The basic corporate stakeholders—those with an interest in firm
decisionmaking—are fairly well known. Employees, shareholders, suppliers,
customers, contractors, and even the community at large all have interests in the
operation of a typical corporation.292 The nature of their interests, of course, may
286

See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-56; Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise
of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213, 251-61 (2003); Melvyn R. Durchslag,
Salyer, Ball, and Hold: Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of Political “Interest”
and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1, 38-39 (1982).
287
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 286, at 248.
288
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 453.
289
See id. at 452-60, 463-64.
290
These two questions are not unrelated, but in order to think through some of the
issues here, we think it helps to keep them separated.
291
See infra, notes 54-56, and accompanying text.
292
See infra, notes 38-42, and accompanying text.
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vary tremendously between groups and, as we’ve seen before, even within
groups.293 This is true both with respect to the content of their preferences (what
they care about) and the strength of the preferences (how much they care). With
few exceptions, both democratic and economic theorists take the contents of
preferences as they come. In politics, for example, we don’t prevent people from
voting because of whom they support or what they believe. 294 Standard
economics treats preferences much the same way, or, if anything, elevates them
to an even more exalted position. Revealed preference theory holds that the best
way to tell what consumers want is to observe their purchasing decisions.295
Economists do not typically claim that consumers didn’t (or shouldn’t) really
want something—they just register existing preferences and build their theories
accordingly.
The strength of constituent interests is a different matter. While we don’t
tell citizens or consumers what to care about, we do make basic decisions about
the structure of governance based on how much we think they care, how much
they have at stake in the outcome of government or firm decisionmaking.
Ideally, in both polities and corporations, we figure out who has strong interests
in the enterprise and assign them the right to vote—a voice in the governance
process.296 Those with a sufficient level of interest vote; those with even more
interest may get some type of additional weight added to their vote. 297 We
believe that those with strong preferences about a matter are the ones who
deserve to have their preferences aggregated.
Though it makes sense as an initial matter to tie voting to preference
strength, we immediately run into a problem: we do not have a foolproof way to
measure the strength of anybody’s preferences.298 We could, of course, just ask
people how strongly they felt about an election outcome. But, with voting or,
more generally, governance, tied to interest, people would have an incentive to
293

See infra, notes 77-80, and accompanying text.
For example, this is the intuition that underpins Kenneth Arrow’s condition of
democratic fairness typically referred to as universal admissibility. See Grant M.
Hayden, Some Implications of Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV.
295, 298 (1995); see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL CHOICE 217 (1982).
295
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U.
L. REV. 4, 4-6 (1994).
296
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-60, 463-64.
297
See id. at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 286, at 248.
298
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 453-54.
294
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strategically misrepresent the strength of their preferences.299 And even if we
had accurate reports from people about how strong their interests were in an
election, we lack a method of neutrally comparing those reports to those of
others who report having an interest.300 There is no universal scale upon which
to measure people’s preference strength; no way, in other words, to carry out
interpersonal utility comparisons in a completely objective manner.301
For these and other reasons, our political system has not generally relied
upon first-person reports to assess preference strength and, thus, the right to
participate. Instead, it has relied upon other proxies, or markers, for a person’s
interest in the outcome of an election.302 Throughout our history, states have
relied on a wide variety of such markers, such as property-holding, taxpaying,
or residency.303 Ultimately, the decision is this: whether the person, based on
certain factors relative to their person, should have the right to participate in
governance.
2.

Marking Interest

The search for a good marker for voter interest boils down to coming up
with an indicator of voter interest that is both accurate and manageable.304 The
accuracy of a marker is a measure of how well it picks out the group of people
who have a sufficient interest in the outcome of an election.305 A marker could
be off by either including too many people who lack a sufficient interest or
excluding people who have a strong interest; in other words, it could be
overinclusive or underinclusive.306 With an overinclusive marker, we risk
extending the franchise to those with a weak or nonexistent interest in the

299

See id. at 453-54.
See id.
301
For a summary of the problem of making interpersonal utility comparisons, see
Hayden, supra note 294, at 236-47. For more general background in the area, see
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds.,
1991); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL
IMPORTANCE 113-20 (1986); Peter Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility:
Why and How They Are and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF
WELL-BEING 200, 238-254 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
302
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 454.
303
See id. at 454-56; Hayden, supra note 286, at 255-59.
304
For an extended discussion of this, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 460-62.
305
See id. at 460.
306
See id.
300
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election, thus diluting the votes of those with a stronger interest.307 An
underinclusive marker is even worse—it leads to outright disenfranchisement of
those with a real stake in the outcome.308 When it comes to assigning weight to
votes, the accuracy of the marker depends on whether and how well it can be
calibrated to the strength of voter preferences.309
Of course, we have no direct way of assessing the accuracy of any marker
because, as mentioned above, we have no direct way of measuring and
comparing preference strength to begin with. Instead, as in any other situation,
we have to made education guesses about how much various people are affected
by the decisionmaking of a particular elected body and make an assumption that
the people more strongly affected will be those with stronger electoral
preferences. These judgments about the strength of people’s interest may be
contested, but they are essential to get any voting system up and running.
We make these kinds of judgments all the time in the political arena. The
early freehold requirements, for example, were an attempt to capture one’s stake
in an election, and they were fine as far as they went (that is, those with a large
amount of property did have an interest in elections), but they were
underinclusive, disenfranchising large numbers of property-less people who
were, nonetheless, also greatly affected by the exercise of governmental
powers.310 More contemporary requirements, such as residency and citizenship,
seem like better (though still imperfect) markers of voter interest. For example,
those who are residents within the jurisdiction of a particular government are
subject to its police powers, taxation, and services, and thus have quite a bit at
stake in an election.311 Residency isn’t perfect, of course. It’s a little
underinclusive, in that it fails to capture those who work or own property in one
place and reside in another.312 At times, it can also be overinclusive, as when it
allows people to vote who plan to move out of town right after election day. 313
But despite debates around the margins, most agree that residency is a more
accurate marker for voter interest than, say, owning property. 314 And, in the
United States, when state and local governments tinker too much and try to use
307

See id.
See id. Of course, we could stitch together more than one underinclusive marker and
better capture voter interest.
309
See id.
310
See id. at 461.
311
See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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markers that are too overinclusive or underinclusive, they are often disallowed
from doing so for that very reason. New York, for example, attempted to limit
voting in certain school district elections to people who either had school-aged
children or owned or leased taxable property in the district.315 The U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged that voting may be tied to interest, but struck these
particular markers as both overinclusive and underinclusive,316 explaining, that
“[s]tatutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose
the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental
affairs which substantially affect their lives.”317
Of course, we could always come up with some more extensive survey of
voter interest to get a better fix on whether any particular person has a strong
interest in the outcome of an election.318 For example, perhaps a survey reveals
that while both Luke and Ben are residents of a certain town, Ben plans to move
away in just a few weeks. A third potential voter, Milo, lives nearby, but works
and owns property in town, including the house where his elderly, dependent
mother lives. With such information, we might conclude that, while residency is
a good starting point, our additional information reveals that, really, Luke and
Milo have sufficient interest in the jurisdiction to vote, and Ben, despite his
current residency, does not. But this kind of individualized preference
information would be incredibly costly to obtain, much less keep up to date.
And, of course, if we obtain this information by asking everyone about their
interests, we’d worry about strategic misrepresentation.319 But, in any case, an
ongoing process of surveying everyone about their potential interests in every
jurisdiction is simply unworkable, which brings us to the second feature of any
good marker: its manageability.320
Democratic institutions have long valued markers for voter interest that are
easily managed. The property-holding and taxpaying requirements of old were
not only useful because they ensured that voters had a financial stake in election
outcomes, they did so with information that was readily available to the state. In
fact, the state and local governments that ran the elections usually had lists of
both property holders and taxpayers, which made it very easy to administer the
voter rolls.321 Residency has been a little harder to pin down—state and local
315

See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
Id. at 632 n.15.
317
Id. at 626-27.
318
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 462.
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See id.
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See id. at 461.
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governments do not, usually, have ready lists of all of their residents—so
residency is often confirmed by requesting some sort of identification with a
name and address on it (a utility bill, for example); if one’s residency is
questioned, it is ultimately something that can be easily confirmed.
Manageability, then, is a key feature of any marker used to pick out a potential
voter’s interest in the outcome of an election.
B. Who Should Vote?
Developing a method of aggregating individual preferences, then, demands
that we first figure out whose preferences to aggregate. This typically involves
finding some way to measure the level of interest that a potential voter has in the
outcome of an election. Because we do not have direct. reliable access to that
kind of information, we usually depend upon some sort of marker for that
interest. And not all preferences are expressed through markers. We generally
divide the electorate into those whose preferences can be expressed through
voting, and those who preferences cannot. Until now, corporate governance has
allowed only shareholders to express their preferences through votes. But it is
time to reexamine this reality.
As detailed earlier, the longstanding theory of the firm counsels that two
groups of constituents—shareholders and employees—have a special
relationship to the corporation that militates in favor of assigning voting rights
to them. In this part, we argue that core features of democratic theory—the tie
between voting and interest and the accompanying need for markers of that
interest—point in the same direction. Here, too, there are features of
shareholders and employees that allow us to distinguish them from other
stakeholders. Most simply, their relationship with the firm gives them the
accurate and manageable markers of interest that other corporate constituents,
in ordinary business situations, lack.
1.

Shareholders

For shareholders, the value of the capital contribution and the percentage of
the dividend interest provide fairly quantifiable measures of the shareholder’s
interest in the corporation. Putting aside any outside interests of the shareholder,
the allocation of one vote for each share accurately correlates to the
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shareholder’s financial interest in the corporation.322 The system of one share,
one vote calibrates the level of interest with the level of input. Shareholding, in
other words, appears to be both an accurate and manageable marker of interest
in a corporation, and thus shareholders should be accorded voting rights.
However, the familiarity of this conclusion belies the complicating factors
to this democratic argument for shareholder voting. Although shares are
originally sold for the same price during the initial public offering, publiclytraded shares soon enter the marketplace, where their values may change
drastically over time. One shareholder may have purchased Facebook shares for
$30 in 2012, while recent shareholders may have paid over $200.323 Although
everyone’s shares may have the same value at any given moment in time,
individual shareholders have likely invested different amounts per share to
obtain those shares (and votes).
Shareholders also have differing interests outside the firm. Those interests
may swamp the shareholder’s interest in the corporation’s residual. Shareholders
may tailor their financial holdings to match shareholder voting power with
counterveiling interests in derivatives or short positions.324 They may have
personal interests, such as family ties325 or religious and political values,326 that
conflict with the principle of shareholder wealth maximization. The
shareholders themselves may be social investing funds327 or sovereign wealth

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 72 (“The most basic statutory voting
rule is the same in every state. It is this: all common shares vote, all votes have the same
weights, and no other participant in the venture votes, unless there is some agreement
to the contrary. Such agreements are rare.”).
323
Cf. Matt Phillips, Facebook’s Stock Plunge Shatters Faith in Tech Companies’
Invincibility,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
23,
2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/business/facebook-stock-earnings-call.html.
324
See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006); Shaun Martin &
Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 780 (2005) (discussing
“economically encumbered” and “legally encumbered” shares).
325
Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1185 (2013).
326
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733 (2005).
327
See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, The Law and Economics of
Environmental, Social, and Governance Investing by a Fiduciary, Working Paper, Sept.
5, 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244665.
322
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funds328 or an algorithm.329 Pension funds may want to promote worker power,
while hedge funds may want to make a quick sale after juicing up the price.
Shareholders do not have “pure” interests as shareholders, no more than citizens
have “pure” interests in the republic.
There is also an accuracy issue when it comes to measuring shareholder
preferences in that it may not be worth the shareholder’s time and investment to
correlate the vote in question accurately with the shareholder’s preferences. The
shareholder interest for those holding only a few shares is rather weak. The move
to passive index funds further removes the shareholder’s interests from any
effort to express those interests through a vote.330 Fully diversified shareholders
are close to indifferent to the fortunes of any particular corporation.
There are also underappreciated difficulties in the manageability of
shareholder voting. Shareholder governance is still centered around the idea of
the annual shareholders meeting, which shareholders in theory are expected to
attend.331 If unable to attend, shareholders designate their voting power to
proxies, who then act on their behalf. Shareholders receive proxy ballots from
the incumbent board, which makes the process much easier while subverting its
democratic nature. Add to this the fact that modern shareholding is generally
managed through intermediaries who hold the shares on behalf of the actual
owner.332 Confusion over voting rights can abound in the context of custodial
ownership, short sales, lending shares, and changes in ownership after the record

328

See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345
(2008).
329
See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 680 (2013).
330
See Lund, supra note 6, at 497 (proposing that lawmakers should restrict truly
passive funds from voting at shareholder meetings because of their lack of interests in
voting).
331
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections
and Shareholders' Meetings, 74 TENN. L. REV. 199, 201 (2007) (discussing the
“mandatory requirement under state corporate law and stock exchange listing standards
that public corporations hold annual shareholders' meetings for the election of
director”).
332
Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections
on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in A More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6–7 (2007) (discussing the “separation of ownership from
ownership,” namely that “the equity of public corporations is often owned, not by the
end-user investors, but by another form of agency, a mutual fund, or other institutional
investor”).
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date.333 Trading shares is also accomplished through lightning-fast technology,
and the allocation of particular shares to particular holders has not caught up
with this technology.334 Although certain reforms may address particular
uncertainties over voting rights for particular shares,335 there remain difficulties
in matching up particular shareholders with voting rights in a particular election.
But despite these concerns, shareholders have sufficiently defined interests
to provide accurate and manageable markers for their voting rights. They have
a clear stake in the outcome of decisionmaking. They have a straightforward
way to calibrate the strength of their interest. And because shareholders provide
unencumbered capital to the corporation in exchange for certain rights to the
residual profits, they cannot register their preferences meaningfully through
agreement alone; they need a governance mechanism. Shareholder voting rights
are designed to manage those preferences.
2.

Employees

Employment is also an accurate and manageable marker of interest in the
success of a corporation. Employees have an interest in the value of the
corporation as expressed through their continued employment. A worker
contributes to the process of joint production through her labor and creates both
specific value (creation of a particular good or service) and longer-term
indefinite value (the value of the ongoing business as expressed through good
will, trademark, and share price). Employees receive wages and benefits and
may, in some cases, participate as shareholders through a 401(k) plan. But they
also have an interest in the ongoing business of the company simply by virtue of
having a job. This job renders them participants in the ongoing production and
entitles them to have a voice in the joint production process through the
governance of the firm.
As compared with shareholders, it is both easier and more difficult to
correlate employment interests with a schema of voting rights within the firm.
Employees are smaller in number, easier to keep track of, and have an
333

Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1227, 1231 (2008) (“The inescapable complexity combined with the already wellstudied issues of shareholders' rational apathy and free rider problems detract from the
case for shareholder voting.”).
334
George Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 22829 (2019) (noting the failure to connect particular shares with their owners in the context
of electronic trading).
335
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attachment to the firm that makes the logistics of election participation easier to
manage. At the same time, there are more factors that could complicate the
assignment of particular voting interests to employees. First, the category of
employment is less clearly defined than the category of shareholder. The test for
“employment” has traditionally been the common-law control test, which asks
whether the employer has the right to control the action of the employee within
the scope of employment.336 The test has uncertain boundaries and can result in
uncertainty over whether a particular worker is an employee or an independent
contractor.337 At the same time, however, corporations officially designate their
employees for tax purposes and withhold employee income taxes.338 This tax
designation would be a fairly straightforward way to delineate employees, and
workers could contest that designation if they felt improperly excluded from the
employment rolls.
Corporations may also struggle over the specific voting rights to be granted
to each employee. The easiest system to administer would allocate one set of
voting rights to each employee. But employees might object to this allocation
along a variety of lines, arguing instead that employees with more seniority,
higher wages, more hours, or greater stature within the company deserve greater
voting rights. Unlike a unit of shares, a unit of “employment” is not the same for
each employee in terms of interest in the firm. The conflict over the allocation

336

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1958) (defining a
servant/employee as: “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other's control or right to control”).
337
Id. § 220 cmt. c (noting that the employment relationship is “one not capable of exact
definition”); Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 661, 682–83 (2013) (“Courts and commentators continue to bemoan [the
control test’s] inability to deliver clear answers.”).
338
Firms are expected to differentiate between employees and independent contractors
over a host of provisions, including whether taxes need to be withheld, 26 U.S.C. §§
3401(c), 3402 (2018), whether the firm must pay a share of Social Security and
Medicare (FICA), id. §§ 3101, 3121(d), and unemployment (FUTA) taxes, id. §§ 3301,
3306(i), for the worker, and whether the workers count as employees for benefit plan
purposes. Id. § 410(a). The IRS defines employees based on the common law control
test. Id. § 3121(d)(2) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any individual
who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employeremployee relationship, has the status of an employee”).
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of employee voting rights is one reason why commentators have argued against
them.339
But this disparity between shareholders and employees can also be
overstated. As discussed above, shareholder voting rights are not always
allocated along the lines of “one share, one vote.” Many of the largest and most
prominent companies—Google, Facebook, Viacom—have allocated voting
rights disproportionately amongst shareholder groups to give a group of
founders, family members, or insiders more power relative to their fellow
stockholders. These companies made this choice based on competing interests
in providing more governance to a select group based on that group’s role within
the firm.340 Similar analyses could apply in the employee voting rights context:
the company could design a system of voting rights based on the relative
importance of employee voice to the company.341 For now, corporations would
face the choice of a straightforward allocation of employee voting rights—one
employee, one vote—or decide to assign voting rights based on a more nuanced
analysis of employee interests.
One other structural concern with adding employee voting rights into the
corporate governance mix is their potential incommensurability with
shareholder voting rights. If we have one share, one vote on one side, and one
employee, one vote on the other, how will we match up these two systems? How
many shares’ worth of votes will one employee have? But matching up two sets
of voters is by no means impossible, and it’s certainly not a reason to shut out a
group of otherwise qualified constituents out of board elections.
When it comes to allocating voting power between shareholders and
employees, we imagine that most corporations would want to take one of two
approaches. The first would provide for separate systems of voting rights in
which there would be no need to measure commensurability. So, for example,
shareholders would vote for a set of shareholder directors, and employee would
vote for a set of employee directors. The voting rights would not need to be
commensurable as they would be participating in different elections. Both the
339

HANSMANN, supra note 87; Henry Hansmann, Employee Ownership and Unions:
Lessons from the Airline Industry, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING
WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 573-80
(Samuel Estreicher, ed., Kluwer Law International, 1998).
340
See Lund, supra note 8 (discussing the benefits of a disproportionate voting
structure).
341
Recent innovations in employee participatory governance structures include
holacracy and other participatory (or “evolutionary”) management structures. See
LALOUX, supra note 13; ROBERTSON, supra note 13.
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German system of codetermination342 and bills recently introduced in the U.S.
Senate track this approach.343
The second possible system would combine shareholders and employees
into a single electorate. The corporation would then have to make a judgment
about how to weight the votes of individual shareholders and employees.
Corporations following this approach would probably start with a judgement
about the general allocation of voting power between shareholders and
employees, and then translate that into individual voting weights. So, for
example, a corporation could decide that employees should have roughly forty
percent344 of the voting rights within the corporation, and then allocate votes
between the two groups based on this rough proportion.345
At this stage, it’s enough to say that the logistical challenges are not
insurmountable. More importantly, they do not justify the exclusion of a set of
corporate participants from participation in governance. Employees are
participants in the firm and contribute their efforts to the process of joint
production. They should not be excluded from governance simply because we
currently have systems in place that find it easier to exclude them.
3.

Other Corporate Constituents

The theory of the firm and democratic participation theory both counsel in
favor of extending the corporate franchise to shareholders and employees. Those
two groups deserve voting rights because they are within the economic firm—
they participate in a process of joint production as carried on by the firm. They
also have the accurate and manageable markers of interest that allow for the
creation of a workable system of corporate governance. The same, however,
cannot be said of other corporate constituents.
342

Andreas Rühmkorf, Company law and corporate governance in Germany: From
stakeholder value to corporate sustainability?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY (Beate Sjåfell &
Christopher Bruner eds., forthcoming 2019); Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination
Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
135, 136 (2016).
343
Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S.
2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
344
Cf. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (assigning employees
with voting rights to 40% of the board).
345
One problem with this type of system is that if one group or the other has a majority
of the votes, they can completely dictate the outcomes of winner-take-all elections.
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Along with the theory of the firm, democratic participation theory provides
a second means of separating the insiders—shareholders and employees—from
other constituents outside the corporation. With most firms, it doesn’t make
sense to capture the preferences of customers, suppliers, and other constituencies
though the franchise. This is both because their interest in the success of the firm
are not as significant as those of the insiders and because their status and
relationship with the firm do not provide particularly accurate or manageable
markers of that interest. For those reasons, participation theory generally
counsels against extending the franchise to these outside stakeholders.
Take, for example, the customers of a large corporation. Customers
certainly have some relationship with a firm such that they have a stake in, and
preferences regarding, its success. But their interest in the continued success of
the company is more tenuous, and their ongoing contacts with the company,
even assuming the planned obsolescence of the latest product, are likely to be
relatively sporadic. Their status as customers is not a particularly strong marker
for interest in the future success of the firm. It’s also not a particularly
manageable marker, given that the company’s interaction with the person may
be limited to the point of sale, if that; after that, tracking the customers becomes
more difficult. The same may be said of a corporation’s suppliers, though the
relationship may be a little closer there, and the markers a little more
manageable.
Of course, there may be certain types of customers who enjoy a continuous
and significant relationship with a corporation such that they have a more
significant interest and it’s more manageable to identify them for the purpose of
extending the franchise. Some utility customers, for example, have that kind of
relationship with their providers.346 And in those situations, democratic
participation theory would counsel in favor of extending them voting rights.
Democratic participation theory is certainly flexible enough to deal with
unique customer bases and the possible rise of accurate and manageable markers
of constituent interest, and assign voting rights accordingly. For now, though, in
the regular course of corporate governance, it militates in favor of extending
voting rights to shareholders and employees and leaving the interests of other
constituents to contract or government regulation.

346

HANSMANN, supra note 87 (discussing how rural electrical cooperatives involve
ownership by customers); Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 229 (arguing that consumers
may have ongoing interests through lock-in purchases).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

2020]

RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION

73

C. The German Experience
Shareholder primacy is so entrenched in American corporate law and
scholarship that it sometimes seems difficult to imagine any other way of
thinking about the corporation. This lack of imagination may help explain why
arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise—recently exposed as being
quite deficient—continue to plod along in the background of an awful lot of
corporate governance scholarship. It has certainly kept many legal scholars from
seriously considering alternative models. There are, however, good examples of
such models, some of which have been around for a century. What’s more: they
specifically involve employee representation on corporate boards.
While the United States itself has some history of employee involvement in
corporate governance, it’s pretty thin gruel.347 The oldest codetermination law
still in force is a 1919 Massachusetts statute that expressly allows a corporation
to have employee representatives on its board.348 That law, however, is
permissive, and there’s not much evidence that corporations in that state have
made use of the option. Union members actually served on the boards of several
large corporations in the 1980s and 1990s, including United Airlines, PanAm,
and Chrysler.349 And, more recently, several bills have been proposed in
Congress that would require employee representation on corporate boards.350
But the American experience with employee board representation has been
isolated, sporadic, and often aspirational.
Europe, though, is another story. Many European countries give employees
some degree of access to corporate boards.351 But the German system of
codetermination offers the most robust protection of employee representation on
corporate boards. German codetermination has also been in place for decades

347

For a good, comprehensive rundown of this, see Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in
America at Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 697 (2019).
348
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156, § 23 (2018); see McGaughey, supra note 347, at 718.
349
See McGaughey, supra note 347, at 736-37.
350
See, e.g., ACCOUNTABLE CAPITALISM ACT, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018)
(requiring 40% of boards in large companies be elected by employees); REWARD WORK
ACT, S. 2605, 115th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2018) (requiring one-third of listed board to be
elected by employees); H.R. 6096, 115th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2018) (same); see also
McGaughey, supra note 347, at 698-99.
351
For a recent list of countries, see Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in Britain:
Shareholder Monopolisation and the “Single Channel”, 47 INDUS. L.J. 76, 79-80, 79
n.17, & 80 fig.1 (2018).
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as part of a large, modern economy, making it the obvious exemplar of such a
system. So it is to this German system that we now turn.
Codetermination actually describes two very different features of German
corporations.352 “Social codetermination” involves employee representation on
shop-level works councils at all companies with at least five employees.353 The
works councils have a broad range of rights in the workplace, ranging from the
right to receive economic and financial information to the right of consultation
on matters relating to the organization and structure of jobs to the power to
negotiate work agreements.354 “Supervisory codetermination,” on the other
hand, describes employee representation at the level of the corporate board,355
and is thus of greater interest here.
Supervisory codetermination laws dictate the composition of the boards of
directors for large German companies.356 Unlike the United States, Germany
uses a two-tiered corporate board structure.357 The supervisory board provides
more general oversight of the company and appoints the members of the
management board.358 The management board runs the company, directing
resources and making the day-to-day business decisions.359 Management boards

352

Here we are using the terminology from Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, The
German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 169
(Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017).
353
See id. at 169-71.
354
See JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS FROM
THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 16-19 (2009).
355
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 169.
356
See id. at 172-78.
357
See Jean J. du Plessis et. al, An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law and
the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted, in GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 1, 8-13 (Jean J. du Plessis
et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017).
358
See Jean J. du Plessis & Otto Saenger, The Supervisory Board as Company Organ,
in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT
105, 133-53 (Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter du Plessis &
Saenger, Supervisory Board]; Jean J. du Plessis & Otto Saenger, The General Meeting
and the Management Board as Company Organs, in GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 63, 73 (Jean J. du Plessis
et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter du Plessis & Saenger, General Meeting].
359
Generally speaking, the two-tiered boards are probably better at supervising top
employees because there are fewer of the conflicts of interest that occur when managers
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of larger companies also have a personnel director responsible for “all matters
relating to labor and social relations.”360 Though this two-tiered board structure
of German corporations is not shared by their American counterparts, there is no
reason to think that their system of supervisory codetermination would not work
with unitary boards.361
The degree of supervisory codetermination on German corporate boards
depends on the type of industry, the number of employees, and a few other
factors.362 Corporations with fewer than 500 employees have supervisory board
members elected by shareholders; corporations with 500 to 2000 employees
typically have one-third of their board members elected by employees (called,
unsurprisingly, one-third board parity); and those with more than 2000
employees have one-half of their supervisory board members elected by
employees.363 In most of these large companies with one-half codetermination,
employees enjoy “quasi-parity” because the shareholders elect the chair (and
potential tiebreaker vote). In the coal, iron, and steel industries, however, there
is a neutral chair (and tiebreaker), giving the employees “full parity,” or a truly
shared system of governance.364 Thus, in Germany, we have a longstanding
example of shared corporate governance, with shareholder and employee
representatives working side by side on the supervisory boards of major
companies.
are on the corporate board; without those managers, though, information may flow to
the supervisory board more sluggishly.
360
Depending on the level of codetermination (discussed below) the personnel director
has the support of the employee representatives of the supervisory board. For full-parity
codetermination governed by the 1952 law, employee representative have veto power
over the appointment of the personnel director; for companies with quasi-parity
codetermination, personnel directors are usually not appointed unless they enjoy the
support of the employee representatives. See Otto Sandrock, German and International
Perspectives of the German Model of Codetermination, 26 EURO. BUS. L. REV. 129,
131-32 (2015).
361
See Tom C. Hodge, The Treatment of Employees as Stakeholders in the European
Union: Current and Future Trends, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L & COM. 91, 116 (2010).
362
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 182-83.
363
See Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, An Overview of the Corporate Governance
Debate in Germany, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN CONTEXT 17, 48-49 (Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017); Sandrock
& du Plessis, supra note 352, at 173-78; ADDISON, supra note 354, at 103; Sandrock,
supra note 360, at 131-32.
364
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 173-76. This is true of companies in
these sectors at a lower threshold—1000 instead of 2000 employees.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

76

Law Review

[Vol. 100

So what have corporate law scholars done with this alternative version of
corporate governance, one that actually exists in flesh and blood German
supervisory boards? For decades, codetermination has received little more than
passing attention from corporate governance scholars. It is rarely given the kind
of in-depth treatment that a fully functioning, alternative model of corporate
governance would seem to demand.365
Codetermination shows up most often in a variant of the contractarian
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise. This version of the argument
is as follows. If codetermination is so great, then firms should voluntarily adopt
it. But firms have not done so. Codetermination, therefore, is not that great and,
in fact, is less efficient than the method of governance chosen in the U.S., with
corporate boards elected by shareholders alone. In fact, the only way a firm
would end up with employee representation on its board is if you force it to do
so, as Germany does by law. Nobody freely chooses codetermination; it is less
efficient than corporate governance structures in which shareholders run the
show.
A number of legal scholars—including George Dent,366 Henry Hansmann
and Renier Kraakman,367 and Roberta Romano368—have argued that
codetermination must be inefficient because it has not been voluntarily adopted
by firms.369 But the argument may have been first (and in any case, most
forcefully) made by Michael Jensen and William Meckling in the late 1970s.370
365

One refreshing exception is EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163-235
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
366
See George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1115 (2008).
367
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 445 (“The growing view today is that
meaningful direct worker voting participation in corporate affairs tends to produce
inefficient decisions, paralysis, or weak boards, and that these costs are likely to exceed
any potential benefits that worker participation might bring.”); Luca Enriques, Henry
Hansmann, Renier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, The Basic Governance Structure:
Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 79, 106 (John
Armour et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017).
368
See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 129-30
(1993).
369
This argument in broader theoretical context is also discussed in ADDISON, supra
note 354, at 104-08.
370
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions:
An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 47375, 503-04 (1979).
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“Without fiat,” they claimed, “codetermination would be virtually
nonexistent.”371 They then backed up this argument with a prediction: German
codetermination would soon devolve into a system in which either shareholders
or employees has complete control.372 If the former, then codetermination would
just go away, and be replaced by the shareholder control that dominates the
landscape in the United States.373 If, however, employees succeed in controlling
firms, then the Germany economy would grind to a halt like Tito’s Yugoslavia,
with “fairly complete, if not total, state ownership of the productive assets in the
economy.”374
Some forty years later, Jensen and Meckling’s prediction looks laughable.
German codetermination remains in place and, as we shall soon see, is an
important aspect of its robust economy.375 More broadly, though, the key
assumption underlying the argument—that codetermination can only arise
through fiat, not voluntary agreement—has itself been revealed to be false. Ewan
McGaughey, a legal historian and economist, recently showed that German
codetermination first arose through collective agreements, and only later was
enacted into law.376 Codetermination arrived at the end of World War I, “not as
a law, not as a regulation, but as an agreement.”377 Only afterward did
supervisory codetermination get codified into legislation.378 Codetermination
was then abolished by the Nazi Regime with a 1934 statute, 379 only to be
recreated—again though consensual agreement—at the conclusion of World
War II.380 The basic sequence was that codetermination arose through
consensual agreement, developed into social consensus, and later became
embodied in the law.381 This history shows that the law and economics scholars
are not just wrong on this point, but may have the picture completely upside
down: codetermination was created by agreement not once but twice, while the
law was sometimes used to quash it.382

371

Id. at 473.
See id. at 503.
373
See id.
374
Id. at 504.
375
See infra notes 389-410 and accompanying text.
376
See McGaughey, supra note 342.
377
Id. at 155.
378
See id. at 157.
379
See id. at 162.
380
See id. at 163-67.
381
See id. at 174.
382
See id. at 170.
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So if codetermination arose through voluntary agreement in Germany, why
didn’t the same bargain get struck everywhere else? What was so special about
Germany? McGaughey identifies two, relatively rare “Goldilocks” conditions
that existed in postwar Germany: first, employers and employees had relatively
equal bargaining power, and, second, the labor movement was unified around a
common objective of securing meaningful representation at work.383 These two
conditions made the codetermination bargain possible.
Now, it might be argued that the historical rarity of these Goldilocks
conditions makes the German example unique, ingermane to the more typical
bargains struck by labor and capital. But a closer look at those conditions shows
that, if anything, the opposite is true. Remember, the contractarian argument
draws its normative force from the assumption that freely bargained for
agreements better reflect the preferences of the parties.384 But in order for this to
work, the parties must actually be free to bargain. That freedom may be limited
if the parties are in unequal bargaining positions (making it less likely that the
weaker party is really getting what it wants), or one group of constituents has
coordination problems (again, reducing their bargaining power), or there are
legal or logistical roadblocks to certain kinds of agreements. The contractarian
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise fails to account for all three of
these issues: employees have never had equal bargaining power; labor unions
have never represented more than one-third of private-sector employees, and
current represent less than seven percent; and both legal and logistical
roadblocks make it difficult for unions to participate in corporate governance.385
There is an additional reason to think that the bargain for employee
representation may not be struck by individual corporations—namely, the pathdependency and network effects of the widespread adoption of a particular
system of governance. David Levine and Laura Tyson, for example, have
argued that codetermination needs to be adopted on a broad scale because

383

See id. at 136-37, 155-56, 168.
See notes 63-72, supra, and accompanying text; see also Hayden & Bodie, supra
note 68, at 531, 533, 541-42.
385
For discussions of the legal impediments to systems of worker participation, see
Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 662-71 (2018);
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann
and Other "Survivalists", 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957 (1998).
384
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individual firms find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma.386 Unilateral adoption
of codetermination may lead to wage compression (resulting in the loss of
managerial and executive employees) and dismissal protections (resulting in the
retention of poorly performing employees), disadvantaging the adopting firm in
relation to its competitors.387 Without some kind of industry-wide (or economywide) agreement, the constituents of individual firms will rationally fail to adopt
the approach that would have the greater utility for all concerned.388 The
industry-wide bargaining that took place in post-war Germany involved exactly
the kind of cooperation needed to lift corporate players out of this prisoners’
dilemma.
So how well has codetermination worked in Germany? Much of the
scholarship evaluating the system has centered on its role in promoting broader
goals such as social cohesion and fairness.389 The bottom-line, economic effects
of codetermination (which we’ll turn to shortly) are either seen as secondary or
as necessarily following from the achievement of these societal goals.390 That is,
codetermination is viewed less in terms of an economic system as one designed
to promote a well-functioning democracy and help prevent social division—in
particular, the division between labor and capital. And, on this broad level, it is
thought to be quite successful.
The success of codetermination on the social level has carried over to the
boardroom, where the relationship between labor and capital are relatively
harmonious.391 Shareholder and employee representatives typically meet
separately, with the managing board, before the supervisory board meetings.392
These pre-meetings allow representatives to focus on the interests of their
constituents and raise concerns with the management boards.393 Recent studies
have revealed that the supervisory meetings themselves are marked by a great

See David I. Levine & Laura D. Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm’s
Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183 (Alan S.
Blinder, ed. 1990).
387
See id. at xx.
388
See id. at xx. Under the prisoner’s dilemma framework, individual players make
less-than-optimal choices because of the interdependency of outcomes and the inability
to trust their partner/opponent.
389
See ADDISON, supra note 354, at 2.
390
See id.
391
See Sandrock, supra note 360, at 131.
392
See du Plessis & Saenger, supra note 363, at 49.
393
See id.
386
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deal of cooperation between shareholder and employee representatives.394 This
cooperation may be fostered in part by the legal requirement that shareholder
and employee representatives must, at that point, put the interest of the
corporation over those of their respective constituents.395 While the relationships
at the supervisory board level are not perfect, they are a far cry from the lawand-economics predictions of firm-destroying voting cycles and other visions of
inter-board squabbling and disfunction.
What about firm performance? At this point, there have been a number of
studies assessing the economic effects of codetermination, with a consensus that
has shifted back and forth over the last four decades.396 Some early studies from
the 1980s found that codetermination had very little impact on corporate
performance.397 Those studies, however, were criticized on a number of
methodological grounds,398 and several more sophisticated evaluations in the
1990s and early 2000s gave a more pessimistic account, finding that
codetermination was associated with, among other things, lower productivity
and lower profits.399 That consensus, though, soon gave way to a third phase in
the literature, one that reversed the principal findings of the second-phase studies
394

See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 186.
See id. at 184; du Plessis & Saenger, General Meeting, supra note 358, at 66.
396
For the best summary of the literature through 2008 and a discussion of the three
initial phases of research detailed below, see ADDISON, supra note 354, at 108-121.
397
See, e.g., Jan Svejnar, Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship, and Codetermination: Econometric Evidence from Germany, 63 REV. ECON. & STATS. 188
(1981) (finding codetermination associated with higher earnings in the iron and steel
industry but not in the coal mining industry); Guiseppe Benelli et al., Labor
Participation in Corporate Policy-Making Decisions: West Germany’s Experience with
Codetermination, 60 J. BUS. 553 (1987) (finding no real differences between firms with
codetermination and without codetermination across a variety of measures of
performance); Michael A. Gurdon & Anoop Rai, Codetermination and Enterprise
Performance: Empirical Evidence from West Germany, 42 J. ECON. & BUS. 289 (1990)
(finding codetermination led to higher profitability but lower productivity).
398
See ADDISON, supra note 354, at 109.
399
See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination,
95 SCAND. J. ECON. 365 (1993) (finding that the shift to quasi-parity codetermination
in 1976 had negative effect on productivity); Theodor Baums & Bernd Frick, Codetermination in Germany: The Impact of Court Decisions on the Market Value of
Firms, 1 ECON. ANALYSIS 143 (1998) (finding that court rulings that expanded or
restricted codetermination had no real effect on share price); Gary Gorton & Frank A.
Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of Codetermination, 2 J. EURO. ECON.
ASS’N 863 (2004) (finding that moving from one-third to quasi-parity codetermination
negatively affected shareholder wealth).
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(finding them to be artefacts of a particular method of assessment)400 and finding
that codetermination was also modestly associated with greater innovation.401
These more optimistic assessments were bolstered by a couple of modern
financial studies on the market value of the firm, which found that “prudent”
levels of employee representation led to better board decisionmaking by
improving monitoring and thus reducing agency costs.402 This third, rather
optimistic phase of assessment brought us right up to one of the most profound
tests of all systems of corporate governance: the global financial crisis.
The financial crisis did not spare any of the world’s major economies, but
some recovered more quickly than others. Germany, in particular, recovered
faster and more thoroughly than many other countries, and did so, at least in part,
because of its corporate governance model.403 Economic downturns are always
difficult for companies and their employees. But codetermination allowed the
management of many companies “to more easily seek the consent of its
workforce for carrying out more or less drastic measures.”404 These measures
included a system (Kurzarbeit) that avoided mass layoffs by temporarily
reducing the working hours (and salaries) of many of the employees.405 This
avoided painful layoffs and allowed companies to retain their core workforces,
which allowed the economy as a whole to avoid the worst of the economic
slump.406
In addition, a number of new studies came out during the period of recovery
that were consistent with the third phase of the literature, showing that
codetermination generally had positive economic effects. One of the stronger
results came from a 2019 study by Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer, and Jörg
400

See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-determination, Efficiency, and
Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. IND. REL. 233 (2005); see also ADDISON, supra note 354, at
115-16, 120.
401
See, e.g., Kornelius Kraft et al., Codetermination and Innovation, Unpublished paper
(University of Essen); see also ADDISON, supra note 354, at 116.
402
See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include
Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN. ECON.
673 (2006); see also Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board
Codetermination in Germany, 21 LABOUR 689 (2007).
403
See Jean J. du Plessis et al., Preface to GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, at vii (Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed.
2017); Sandrock, supra note 360, at 136.
404
See Sandrock, supra note 360, at 134.
405
See id.; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 188-89, 193.
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See Sandrock, supra not 360, at 134; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 18889, 193.
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Heining, which showed that shared governance was “associated with an increase
in capital formation and a shift towards more capital intensive production,”
probably because it facilitated cooperation between firms and their
employees.407
The recent performance of the German economy has begun to change the
way people view codetermination: the German business community looks at it
in a more positive light,408 and foreign businesspeople—long baffled by the
complex codetermination laws, sees some of its advantages.409 The popularity
of codetermination among the German people rose to an all-time high by
2016.410
So what does all this mean? At minimum, the success of the German system
serves as an empirical rejoinder to the hypothetical arguments used by law and
economics scholars to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise.
Codetermination was born of consensual agreement at a time when labor and
capital had roughly equal bargaining power, and only later became enshrined in
law. German firms have not been paralyzed by their more heterogeneous board
electorates. And they have not been destroyed by voting cycles. The existing
arguments against employee representation were already in trouble on their own
theoretical terms; the presence of a significant, well-functioning counterexample
should be decisive.
To be sure, German codetermination has its faults.411 Its large, two-tiered
board structures have been criticized.412 Employee representatives are elected
through what appears to be an unnecessarily baroque version of an electoral
college.413 And it may not directly translate to the United States for a variety of
social or cultural reasons. But it is certainly functioning well enough that it
cannot be dismissed, and it provides a proof of concept of the mutual-control
model of corporate governance.
407

See Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer & Jörg Heining, Labor in the
Boardroom, at 28-29, http://economics.mit.edu/files/17273 (unpublished
manuscript) (emphasis supplied).
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See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 237; Otto Sandrock, The Impact of
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GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT
243, 320 (Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017).
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V. CONCLUSION
We have reached a critical point in the development of the corporation.
Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for
ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Employees are
agitating for greater say at their workplaces—resisting mandatory arbitration
clauses, objecting to corporate expressions of political and religious views, and
questioning the distribution of the profits of their labor. In turn, state and federal
politicians are beginning to respond to these issues both on their own terms and,
more significantly, by thinking more broadly about the fundamental structure of
corporate governance.
At the same time, the intellectual foundations of the modern corporation
continue to disintegrate. The law-and-economics justifications for some of the
core features of the modern corporation—the shareholder primacy norm and the
exclusive shareholder franchise—have been exposed. Those arguments, it turns
out, are based on flawed assumptions about the nature of shareholder
preferences, misapply basic social choice theory, and are often inconsistent with
some of the fundamental precepts of standard economics that are purported to
support them. Their proponents are now at the point where they are unwilling to
defend these arguments and yet strangely reluctant to abandon them, choosing
instead to continue to rely on them without comment. The way we have
constructed the modern corporation is under a great deal of pressure, from within
and without.
As we are forced to move away from the existing corporate order, we need
to acknowledge the shortcomings (and the strengths) of its intellectual
framework and begin to develop new models of firm governance. In this Article,
we have cataloged the arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise and,
one by one, found them lacking, usually on their own terms. We then presented
a new model of corporate governance that builds on eighty years of research into
the nature of the firm and finds further support in a new theory of democratic
participation that ensures the proper aggregation of constituent preferences
through accurate and manageable markers. In sum, this article sets out the
intellectual framework that will allow investors, employees, and policymakers
to navigate the collapse of the shareholder primacy norm and, at the same time,
provides a positive argument for the inclusion of workers in the future of
corporate governance.
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